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THESIS

JAPAN'S MARITIME IMPERATIVE

by
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis identifies factors that may induce Japan to create greater military capabilities and normalize military force as a potential source of national power in its security policies. A realist theoretical framework for analysis is constructed. It consists of Great Power Theory, the Law of Comparative Advantage, and the Utility of Military Force, and dismisses the artificial divisions between levels of analysis. The thesis examines the failure of Japan's national security doctrine in the post-Cold War world. It explores the impact of economics, Japan's national goals, security threats, and the US-Japan alliance on the country's construction and normalization of increased military capabilities. Japan's primary obstacles to military normalization, Article 9 of its constitution and domestic opinion, are assessed. The thesis concludes that Japan's national talents, production capabilities, and status as a maritime nation make it likely that it will construct more capable naval forces to respond to imperatives in the post-Cold War environment.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis is to identify factors that may prompt Japan to create greater military capabilities and to normalize the concept of military force in its national security policy. It answers two questions. First, will Japan create a more capable military force in the post-Cold War era? Second, what type of military force will Japan construct? The thesis analyzes the way in which Japan's Comprehensive Security policy, economics, the pursuit of "normalcy," security threats, and the US-Japan security alliance are shaping Japan's military and policy transitions. It will demonstrate that Japan's likely area of military expansion will be its Maritime Self-Defense Forces. It suggests that the United States will have a significant impact on the force shaping and force normalization through its alliance relationship with Japan.

This topic is important for two reasons. First, the United States will be required to accept Japan as a stronger (but still subordinate) partner in its Asian foreign policy. Behind the American Cold-War military shield, Japanese foreign policy reflected US preferences. In the current multi-polar environment, however, serious domestic and external challenges could force Japan to take actions independent of that alliance's constraints or privileges. The United States must have an understanding of the dynamics that are shaping Japanese military and foreign policy decisions. As Japan's only formal ally, America has considerable influence in its decision making. An appreciation of Japan's position in twenty-first-century world politics will allow the United States to

guide Japanese decision making to preserve regional stability, maintain America's leadership role in Asia, and strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

Second, to maintain its stabilizing influence in Asia, the United States must foster Japanese maritime growth and its overall self-defense capabilities. The provisions of the US-Japan security agreement require Japan to assume more responsibility for its own defense to free limited American forces for other actions in Asia. It also requires Japan to increase its direct support of US military operations. Both provisions demand greater Japanese maritime capabilities. Domestic resolve to become a "normal state" along with Japan's embarrassment over its lack of support for American actions in the 1991 Persian Gulf War will, most likely, compel it to support more forthrightly the requirements of the US-Japan security agreement.

Chapter I presents an overview of the thesis and four theoretical assumptions used in following chapters. Chapter II examines factors that may compel Japan to increase its military capabilities. Japan's Comprehensive Security, domestic economics, Japan's pursuit of "normalcy," security threats, and the US-Japan security alliance are explored. Chapter III presents the primary obstacles, Article 9 and domestic opinion, to any increase in military capability Japan might pursue. Chapter IV examines factors that continue to focus Japan's military growth toward a maritime force. Chapter V concludes with a summary of the key issues facing the United States in managing the security alliance.

I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Imperatives

The international structure that has developed since the end of the Cold War has placed new constraints on how states interact and wield their instruments of national power. Japan, like other countries, will have to decide whether to alter the size and capabilities of its armed forces, as well as its concepts for the use of military force in pursuit of its national goals. As Japan moves into the twenty-first century, key internal and external factors will affect its national security policy. The ineffectiveness of Japan's Comprehensive Security approach, based on the primacy of economic strength and foreign aid, in preserving regional stability and gaining international prestige, has disrupted long-accepted paradigms in Japan's national security thinking (Funabashi, 1998). In addition, Japan's changing economy and demographics may deepen its global economic commitments raising its overseas business assets and numbers of citizens abroad. This could bring with it responsibilities for protecting and evacuating those assets and citizens during political upheavals and natural disasters. These factors, along with Japan's desire to become a "normal state," are pressures that may result in enhanced defense force capabilities and an increased willingness to incorporate military force in Japan's national security policy.

Japan also may be forced to increase its armed forces' power projection capabilities in response to its growing territorial and psychological insecurities. Evolving regional threats include the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the possibility of a unified Korean nation, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional territorial disputes, and an Asian arms race. Alliance with the United States does not fully relieve Japan's anxieties. The United States, as the primary stabilizing force in the region, might be reluctant to intervene in regional disputes and to protect Japan's interests. With a regional perception of falling American prestige, Japan is not completely confident that its superpower ally will always be available or risk complicated involvement on behalf of Japan's perceived national interests. America's proper orchestration of the US-Japan alliance is crucial in shaping Japan's military capabilities and policies.

2. Restrictions

In increasing its military capabilities, Japan must balance its need for a more capable military with the restrictions of domestic opinion and Article 9 of its "Peace" constitution. Japanese officials must gain the acquiescence of the Japanese people for an increase in capabilities. Japan must also decide whether to revise or reinterpret its laws to allow necessary changes. Because of its war record as an aggressor, Japan also must consider opposition from other Asian nations in its force posture decisions.

3. Reactions

Japan could respond to these imperatives with a more maritime oriented and role specific military, which is more technologically advanced, possessing the ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific region beyond the limited, one thousand-mile corridor instituted in response to the US-Japan security agreement. Based on the law of comparative advantage, its economy, national talents, and its sensitivity to ground force operations, Japan may discover that the increased development and restructuring of its maritime forces will be the most productive course of action while incurring the least economic and political costs. Japan's maritime capabilities will probably emphasize operations other than war (OOTW) and strategic, sea-based defense as well as its current orientation to *guerre de course*.

Since Japan is the region's second most capable naval power, after the United States, this evolution will be a logical choice. A maritime oriented force will maximize Japan's industrial talents and resources. It has already begun this transformation to a power projection force with recent commitments to the support requirements outlined in the 1996 US-Japan security treaty, request for a sea-based Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system, and the 1997 introduction of the Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship JDS *Osumi*.

4. Consequences

Japan's failure to assume its role as a "great power" and adapt to the imperatives of the international system could result in its loss of net power, influence and prestige in

world politics (Layne, 1993). Japan must balance its sources of national power to prevent this loss and achieve its national goals. It needs economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military power together, in a combined effect, each factor amplifying the other and compensating for the shortcomings of any one factor (Drew and Snow, 1988). Japan also may come to recognize that a state's physical strength underlies the credibility of all other sources of national power. In its evolution toward becoming a complete power, Japan may realize that military force has utility beyond the battlefield.

5. Cautions

Discussion of and predictions for Japanese military forces require caution. Japan's behavior from 1868 to 1945, failure to appraise its legacy accurately, and its post-war pacifism can cause emotions to cloud assessment. Some analysis of Japanese military capabilities and future trends fluctuates between predictions for unrestrained militarism to abject pacifism. Article titles reveal this trend toward hyperbole: *From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism* (Berger, 1993); *Japan Ponders Power Projection* (Cloughley, 1996); *The Once and Future Superpower* (Menon, 1997); and *Japan's Military Force: Return of the Samurai?* (Halloran, 1996). Of those that predict a more robust Japanese military, few explore a possible moderate Japanese approach to security. This thesis suggests that an incremental and force-specific type of Japanese military growth is likely. No radical changes are foreseen. Japan may gradually replace the sword at its side for a larger, sharper one, but the blade will remain in its scabbard.

B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The following theories are presented to establish assumptions underlying the analysis. These theoretical generalizations link the various factors examined providing boundaries, focus, and direction in exploring Japanese defense alternatives. They are the lenses through which empirical information is interpreted.

1. The Rise of Great Powers

The anarchic international system contains incentives for states to become great powers if they are capable. If a state is capable of achieving great power status, and it fails to do so, it will be punished by the system. (Layne, 1993 :15).

The principal interest of states is their own survival. In an anarchic system, the survival of states is in constant danger. Therefore, governments have an abiding and powerful interest in making their countries more secure. (Waltz, 1979 :107,127) If states cannot garner a sufficient share of security on their own, they will attempt to balance with another state against their greatest threat. This is a source of alliances. (Walt, 1987 :7-33) Alliance benefits, however, are not without entanglements. A gain of power in the international system leads to greater commitments for leadership, greater interests, and increasingly complex responsibilities in that system. (Kennedy, 1987 :xxiii)

States must adapt to international norms if they are to gain great power status. They must accept the established paradigms of international interaction to be effective in the system. (Walt, 1987) When these paradigms shift, states must shift with them or risk vulnerability. As Japan attempts to secure its place in the new international system, it

must shift the methods with which it wields national power. From 1945 to the end of the Cold War, Japan emphasized the primacy of economics. It was able to do so because of a stable, bipolar system in which the efficacy of military force was suppressed by the disproportionate power held by the Soviet Union and the United States. It also was able to translate this economic power into military power through its alliance with America. This paradigm has changed in the post-Cold War world. The new system may require Japan to increase its military capabilities in the current unipolar system especially as it evolves to multipolarity.

2. Law of Comparative Advantage: Specialization and Division of Labor

Though the law of comparative advantage, specialization, and division of labor are three theories normally associated with economics, they can be extended to the realm of international relations and alliances. Briefly, the law of comparative advantage asserts that, of all the things a state might try to produce, it can produce one, or a small number of things most efficiently for the world market. It is to a state's benefit to do this rather than try to produce everything and be self-sufficient. The validity of this concept is illustrated by the success of countries that have integrated into the world economy compared to the failure of autarky as in the DPRK's *Juche* concept. No state has the resources, expertise, and capacity to produce all items with the highest quality and at the best price. If countries employ their resources in creating the items they can efficiently produce, they can profitably participate in the world economic system. (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985 :833)

Security arrangements are similar. Few states have the capacity to create a robust military capacity across the full spectrum of land, sea, and air warfare. Depending on a state's strengths, weaknesses, and liabilities, trying to produce all of these capabilities may reduce its ability to do any of them well or have consequences in one field that will negatively impact the others. For instance, states wishing to avoid diplomatic disadvantages or proliferation of WMD in their region by producing nuclear weapons may opt to rely on the nuclear protection of a larger power that already possesses such weapons.

An example of miscalculating comparative advantage is Syria's use of its air force against the Israeli Air Force in the 1982 clashes over the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon during Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee. Because the Syrians could not skillfully conduct air-to-air maneuver combat, they lost over 100 aircraft to proficient Israeli fighter pilots without shooting down a single enemy warplane. In contrast, Egypt acknowledged its limitations in air-to-air battle during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It relied on the combined arms effect of its Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile umbrella to shoot down 50 Israeli planes in the first three days of combat (Herzog, 1998 :31).

Specialization permits each state to produce a product, or in this case a security function, that exploits its advantages in technology, resources, or national character. In the earliest economic and security systems people knew the advantage of establishing a division of labor—better to let the strong fight, the slow fish, and the smart lead. (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985 :54) All existed in a symbiotic relationship. The precedent for this has already been established in the security arena when the former

Czechoslovakia supplied nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) teams for coalition forces during the Gulf War. Specialization and division of labor require interdependence (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985 :54). States need others to make up for the systems or services that they forego in the name of efficiency.

3. The Utility of Military Force

The overwhelming evidence in the post-Cold War era shows that economic primacy is no substitute for economic primacy backed by force in international relations. With most of the world now engaged in the free market system, the world might appear to lack economic borders, but it is not borderless in politics. With the European Union as an exception, states cling to their sovereignty. With no world government and no enforceable international rules, states still seek security because they must, or potentially be left to the ravages of other states that are more aggressive. (Lim, 1999 :112) Japan's foreign policy, based on economic primacy, is a product of the unique US-Japanese relationship during the Cold War. In this continuing relationship, America brings an overwhelming force of arms and a nuclear umbrella. Japan's adherence to this alliance is a tacit acknowledgement of the utility of force.

Money is not enough to create leverage over other states. Only force or the credible use of force underlying other policies will achieve reliable results. World appeasement of Saddam Hussein did not stop his army from invading Kuwait in 1990. It took force remove Iraq from Kuwait. Diplomacy was ineffective in preventing the 1996 Taiwan Straight Crisis. Two carrier battle groups, however, *were* effective in deterring

further Chinese aggression toward Taiwan. The United State's sanctions on Iraq in 1998 had to be augmented with Operation Desert Fox, the bombing of key Iraqi targets, to effect change. States choose security over money (Lim, 1998 :122).

Japan's use of economics as a substitute for military credibility has failed to produced concrete political results in the post-Cold War world. Economics could not stop India or Pakistan from detonating nuclear weapons even though Tokyo promised economic inducements and sanctions to both countries. (Funabashi, 1998) India and Pakistan's decisions to detonate nuclear weapons were based on traditional factors of power, status, and security. (Lim, 1999 :112) Neither could economics influence France or China to cease their nuclear tests a few years earlier. Poor nations, especially those that do not subscribe to the free market system, are not deterred by economic threats: when North Korea launched its Taepodong missile over Japan in August 1998 it hardly improved its economic prospects. The DPRK derives approximately four billion dollars of hard currency annually from its surreptitious domination of Japan's pachinko gambling parlors and its workers in Japan (Bandow, 1996 :129). That is 21 percent of its \$19.3 billion per year revenues (CIA Factbook, 1998). It is willing to risk these economic gains, however, in its quest for status and power.

4. Levels of Analysis and Their Artificial Divisions

States' actions are shaped by the structure of the international system. States, however, make unit-level decisions which in turn affect the way the state acts within and upon that system. This interaction is a feedback loop. (Layne, 1993 :9) Systems in one

level of analysis can have shaping effects on systems, and even units within those systems, at other levels.

Rigid divisions between levels of political activity inhibits the analysis of the interrelationship between specific factors which lay in both the international and domestic level. Kenneth Waltz has posited distinctions between the international, domestic, and individual levels. (Waltz, 1979 :49) The purpose of these barriers is to focus analysis on an appropriate sphere of activity. This isolates a set of relationships from the unpredictable and numerous details that would otherwise distract the analyst from identifying consistent patterns. This approach, however, does not allow for cause and effect analysis of a specific set of variables that lay athwart the barriers, a vertical set which cross-cuts through more than one level.

The barriers between the domestic and international levels need to be eliminated to see which domestic and international interests correspond with particular strategies of development (Cumings, 1989 :206). In his study of Chinese foreign policy, Bruce Cumings noted that as the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is erased, we can see that for each *domestic* Chinese development strategy there is a *foreign* policy corollary. (Cumings, 1989 :206) Thus, we are led to believe that domestic policy, which is subject to unit-level actions, has a direct effect on a state's behavior within the international system. That this behavior is, at the same time, constrained by the international system has already been established.

5. Application

The following chapters will analyze factors affecting Japan's transition in the perception of military force and the alteration of its military to reflect this perception and domestic, as well as military imperatives based on the aforementioned presumptions. Chapter II examines factors that may compel Japan to increase its military capabilities. Japan's Comprehensive Security, domestic economics, Japan's pursuit of "normalcy," security threats, and the US-Japan security alliance are explored. Chapter III presents the primary obstacles, Article 9 and domestic opinion, to any increase in military capability Japan might pursue. Chapter IV examines factors that continue to focus Japan's military growth toward a maritime force. Chapter V concludes with a summary of the key issues facing the United States in managing the security alliance.

II. FACTORS OF MILITARY EXPANSION

Men, arms, money, and provisions are the sinews of war, but of these four, the first two are the most necessary; for men and arms will always find money and provisions, but money and provisions cannot always raise men and arms.

--Machiavelli

A. INTRODUCTION

The Japanese defense establishment and government are going through significant changes in structure and philosophy. Due to the end of the Cold War, Japan created its 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO); only the second NDPO in its history. This plan was designed to reconfigure the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) based on the change in threat faced by Japan and the change in roles of the SDF. Japan's national security planners argued that the threat of major war was replaced by a more complex series of threats. These include regional conflicts, WMD, and international unpredictability in contrast to the predictability previously ensured by world bipolarity. Japan also expects the SDF to play a greater role in non-defense areas than in the past. This includes disaster relief operations and, what it ambiguously titles, "building a more stable security environment," an indirect reference to greater participation in United Nations (UN) operations. (Defense of Japan, 1997)

Accordingly, the Japanese are restructuring the SDF with the premises of the NDPO as a guide. The new emphasis is on replacing quantity with quality, upgrading capabilities with technology. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) has reduced the number

of SDF personnel and older equipment to prepare for a qualitative upgrade of weapons systems. The list of new equipment Japan is acquiring is impressive. The SDF is purchasing additional Aegis destroyers to create an all Aegis fleet; three, flat-deck amphibious ships to replace aging Landing Ship Tanks (LST); Airborne Warning And Control (AWAC) aircraft; the F-2 fighter; in-flight refueling capabilities; reconnaissance satellites; and a TMD system represented by Patriot IIIs at present with a planned upgrade to an Aegis system when developed. (Japan Naval Attaché, 1999) The force is becoming increasingly maritime in nature. Japan has also launched a new central intelligence organization, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), and JDA Operations Bureau to better its C4I¹ capabilities (Karniol, 1997). Japan's Diet has recently passed several new initiatives that will provide more freedom of action to SDF units in self-defense, allow greater cooperation with and support for US Forces, and allow the SDF more extensive participation in UN operations and OOTW. There is even a movement to elevate the Defense Agency to ministerial status, a measure unthinkable just a few years ago. (Klare, 1997)

1. New Actions, Old Paradigms

New force structures, employment concepts, and increased use of the SDF signal an expanded use of the military in Japanese national security policy and an increase in Japan's military capabilities. Yet, Japan still remains committed to its Peace constitution.

¹ C4I= Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. Integrated system of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, facilities, communication computers, and supporting intelligence assets. (FM 101-5-1)

Japan is addressing new requirements for the use of military force *de facto* but not *de jure*. It is creating more capable forces that will be compelled to operate within the same, pacifist framework it espoused during the Cold War. Its actions may reach a point of non-compatibility with its ideology. The conflict between Japan's ideology and its actions will end with either a doctrinally retrenched Japan or a country that exercises power concomitant with its status as the world's second wealthiest democracy. The process of change will alter Japan's force structure and its employment concepts further in an interactive process. Imperatives will create change. Change will create new imperatives.

2. Underlying Causes Compelling Structural and Policy Revision

Japan appears to be gradually changing its doctrine on the integration of force in its policies (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993). These changes are responses to the interaction of domestic and international factors which are discussed in sections B through F (Ezraty, 1997). They are:

- a. The obsolescence of Japan's Comprehensive Security policy.
- b. Domestic economic transitions.
- c. Japan's desire to transition to a "normal" state.
- d. The nature of Japan's national security threats.
- e. The character of the US-Japan alliance.

These factors are forcing Japan to interact more in the international system with concomitant responsibilities, obligations, concessions, and costs (Waltz, 1979). As a result, Japan is beginning to assume the characteristics of other states that have a powerful economy and a large stake in the international system.² The international system is compelling Japan to balance economics, diplomacy, and psychology with gradually increasing amounts of military capabilities to wield national power effectively (Drew and Snow, 1988).

3. Pursuit of National Goals

Japan has a tradition of pragmatic national security policies. It has pursued the same national goals since 1868, varying its methods and policies according to their efficacy and the prevailing international norms and parameters of the time.

When the Tokugawa Shogunate was deposed in 1868, Japan established three national goals: physical security, economic security, and international prestige (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1989). Japan feared foreign exploitation which had emasculated Imperial China. Its three national goals were designed to guarantee Japan's sovereignty by insuring its strength. Strength was to be achieved by replicating the West's technological and military capabilities and then surpassing them.³ Japan had only decades to achieve progress the West had gained in a hundred years. It created a strong,

² Those aspiring to be great powers will compete. Kenneth Waltz states, "Competition produces a tendency toward sameness of the competitors." (Waltz, 1979 :127)

³ The phrase "catch up and surpass the West" (*oitsuki, oikose*) epitomized this sentiment (Kazenstein and Okawara, 1993).

centralized state, wedded itself to the international economic system, and engaged in imperialist practices just like its successful Western mentors. (Price, 1946)

Japan's methods proved disastrous in the 1920s. Dependent upon Western markets and investment, its economy collapsed when the United States turned inward during the Great Depression. Flexible Japan tried a different approach. It attempted to create an enclosed economic system in Asia known as the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." When Japan perceived the West was turning against it in competition for markets and resources, it resorted to militarism to take by force what it could not retain by political action in the League of Nations. The civilian government lost control of the Imperial Military through subtle flaws in Japan's governmental system.⁴ The result was an overemphasis on military power to achieve its national goals, confrontation with the United States, and defeat in the Second World War.

From 1945 to the present, Japan has relied on the primacy of economic strength in its national security doctrine. The Japanese call this system *Comprehensive Security*. To recover and progress in the post-war era, Japan adapted its sources of national power to the prevailing norms of the Cold War. Like its militarism of the Pacific War era, Japan's approach, Comprehensive Security, is gradually becoming outdated. If it remains true to its historical patterns, Japan may again change its national security doctrine to continue the pursuit of its national goals.

⁴ The two most significant were the lack of Diet control of the military and the minority veto given the military by requiring that it approve of the cabinet before a government could be formed. (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1989)

B. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: JAPAN'S OUTDATED DOCTRINE

1. Origins

The origins of Japan's Comprehensive Security date to the founding of the post-war state. On 8 September 1951 Japan signed its peace treaty with the United States officially ending the Second World War. In what was called the "Yoshida Doctrine" after Japan's first post-war Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, Japan gained the privilege of pursuing economic growth under the protection of America's armed forces while being required to maintain a small military force under the alliance. During most of Japan's post-war history, it has only spent about one percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense per year. Japan prospered under American protection. Accordingly it pursued limited foreign relations and an isolationist approach to world political affairs.

The Yoshida Doctrine evolved from the "protection of the economy" to the "primacy of the economy" in Japan's limited foreign relations. Comprehensive Security was first articulated by the Japanese government as the basis for its national security policy in the late 1970s (Ball, 1993 :60). The Japanese Defense Agency defined it as follows:

Efforts in non-military as well as military terms have generally become very important to ensure national security today. Promotion of diplomacy for peaceful purposes and measures to ensure the supply of energy and food are all indispensable for the existence of a country. In order to achieve national security, it is necessary to incorporate every measure, both military and non-military in a comprehensive and coordinated way. (JDA in Ball, 1993 :60)

This statement appears similar to most nations' security policy except that the Japanese base theirs on a doctrine of pacifism derived from the legal interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. This interpretation prevents Japan from using military force in its foreign policy. Thus, "military measures" are removed from Japan's foreign policy process leaving economics to compensate for them.

Political scientists disagree over the efficacy of Comprehensive Security. Neo-liberals believe that Japan is on the cutting edge of a new norm for international relations. Peter Polomka, writing in the *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, typifies those who suggest there has been a paradigm shift, that new and more powerful factors have supplanted the efficacy of force in international relations. He writes:

Science's new paradigm should be persuading statesmen and their advisers not only that the world will not return to the European-style balance-of-power politics of the past, but also that even the most powerful states are destined increasingly to become in different ways "incomplete powers."

...Realism's nineteenth-century "normal state" is a relic of the past. The emergence of the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) testify to that reality. (Polomka, 1998 :183)

Neo-realists say Comprehensive Security clashes with Japan's otherwise realist disposition. Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels have synthesized Japan's emphasis on economics with a structural realist framework, labeling the resultant hybrid "mercantile realism." They claim Japan has substituted economic security interests for traditional definitions of balanced security within a structural realist outlook. (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998)

Definitions of Comprehensive Security are not as important as determining whether the system works and will continue to work within the new paradigm of the post-Cold War. Is economic primacy a sufficiently controllable and reliable basis for Japan's national security? Will economics alone provide leverage over other countries to yield political gains? We can reasonably expect Japan to alter its Comprehensive Security doctrine if it is ineffective.

2. *Kinken Gaiko*

Military protection and foreign policy leadership by the United States during the Cold War era not only allowed Japan the luxury of focusing its efforts toward economic primacy in its foreign policy, it prevented Japan from using any other method. (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1989) With military and diplomatic facets of its national power suppressed, Japan emphasized economics to compensate. Japan's national security became weighted in favor of economics. The diplomacy and foreign policy that the country did exercise primarily focussed on improving its economy. The primacy of making money evolved into using money in the exercise of Japan's policies since the country lacked a doctrine for the credible use of force. Japan's critics have labeled this type of diplomacy *kinken gaiko*, or money diplomacy (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993). It is the central mechanism of Japan's Comprehensive Security doctrine.

The Japanese government views foreign aid as a primary component of *kinken gaiko*. It has sought to conduct foreign policy with monetary inducements and to substitute these inducements for military strength. As a founding member of the

Development Assistance Committee in 1961, Japan is the largest foreign aid donor in the world. Between 1991 and 1996 Japan spent over 70 billion dollars in net disbursements to the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) fund. (Hunsberger, 1997 :92). Monetary aid was one of the first items Japan withheld from India and Pakistan when both nations refused to comply with Japanese demands to cease nuclear testing. The India/Pakistan case is but one that illustrates how money has little effect in persuading states to acquiesce to the will of another state. (Lim, 1998) In his case studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid as diplomatic leverage, Stephen Walt has shown that it plays a minor and ineffective role in alliances. "It [foreign aid] encourages favorable perceptions of the donor, but it provides the patron with effective leverage only under rather rare circumstances." (Walt, 1987 :45)

The Japanese have used the ODA to buy national security within the US-Japan alliance. They have made these donations to compensate for a lack of military contributions to the alliance. With US collusion, Japan has used ODA funds in a failed attempt to increase stability in areas of mutual interest to America and Japan. (Keddell, 1993) Japan also has unsuccessfully used large amounts of ODA, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank support for third world countries, especially African states who make up the largest third world membership, to garner support for its national goals such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. (Tamamoto in Hunsberger, 1997 :10) Numerous upheavals in Africa since the end of the Cold War along with Japan's failure to gain a permanent seat, or maintain its temporary seat on the UN Security Council illustrate the failure of this approach. Ineffectiveness in the Third World,

coupled with the ignominy of *kinken gaiko* revealed after the Gulf War, have rendered Japan's money diplomacy and its ODA efforts obsolete and disreputable (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 and Lim, 1998).

Many critics see *kinken gaiko* as an extension of Japan's corrupt *kinken seiji*, or money politics (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :17). Of note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is the primary controlling agency of both ODA funds and UN diplomatic efforts (Kei in Hunsberger, 1997 :93 and Drifte, 1999 :89). The MOFA, Ministries of Finance (MOF) and International Trade and Industry (MITI) are the principal agencies which formulate Japanese security policy, with MOFA playing the leading role (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993). But the ODA is not merely a foreign policy tool of the government. The role of Japanese business in ODA direction and in tying grants and aid to purchases from Japanese companies makes ODA a *key link* between *kinken gaiko* and *kinken seiji* (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993). Japan's critics are right.

3. Economics - An Unstable Basis for Security

Japan's economic crisis has demonstrated that the basis of Japan's security, *economic primacy*, is unreliable because economies are both unpredictable and uncontrollable. Japan cannot defend its national interests with economics because it cannot reliably control its economic situation. In most democracies, the armed forces, a primary basis for national security, answers to the commands of its government. The government exerts positive control over the military's size, weapon procurement, and combat power. Adam Smith correctly postulated that economies are too complex to be

successfully directed by governments (Kober, 1995). As collapsed Communist countries discovered in the early 1990s, a state's economic system answers to thousands of enigmatic forces that can never be adequately and predictably controlled or manipulated (Kober, 1995). Military power, in contrast, can still be viable even after economic collapse. Though the Soviet Union disintegrated primarily due to economic inviability, no one doubted that Russia's military remained a potent force in the world. Even in 1999, though Russia remains in financial turmoil, America has carefully weighed Moscow's potential military response in the Kosovo conflict.

Though overwhelming evidence suggests that policies backed by the potential use of military force are more potent than policies not based on a nation's credible use of force, some academics argue that neither military forces nor economics can guarantee a state's national security.⁵ The outcomes when employing either, they assert, are often beyond the control of governments (Wirtz, 1999). Military forces may not guarantee a state's security, but unlike economic inducements, their efficacy is not left to be decided solely by the adversary. Initiative is not entirely surrendered to the opponent. Executor control over and input into events is diminished with economic inducements alone. It is greater when military force is added to policy formulation. A state's ability to positively and concretely influence its mechanisms of national security provides a measure of security in itself. This may only be a psychological panacea, but security is relative. It is a matter of perspective.

⁵ See the theoretical assumptions on the utility of military force in Chapter I.

One of the measures of whether a state is secure is the perception among its citizens of whether they *feel* secure or not. What makes voters sleep well at night or protest to their political representatives is the perception of having or not having security. Recent episodes such as the Japanese hostage crisis in Peru, North Korea's Taepodong missile firing over Japan, and Japan's lack of influence over Pakistan and India have made Japanese citizens feel both insecure and impotent (Kirk, 1998 and Nakasone, 1998). Loss of economic prosperity due to the Asian economic crisis is exacerbating the feeling that security is being lost. (Dibb, Hale, and Prince, 1998) The relationship between economics and security has been shaken by these events which the Japanese see as proof of a lack of security.

Comprehensive Security's economic principles transfer the execution of foreign policy to corporations creating a loss of control by the government. Allowing businesses to conduct Japan's foreign policy removes the amount of central control necessary for the Japanese government to execute coordinated policy decisions based on long-term goals. Corporations are notoriously short-sighted in their outlook. Moreover, their objective is profit, not security. They will inevitably make decisions that ignore the long-term goals of the state in favor of their profitability.⁶

Japan's decentralized, business-centered security is no longer acceptable in the post-Cold War era because competition for the rewards of the international system has increased with the release of superpower tensions. This has made it more difficult for

⁶ Taiwan is an example of how business interests can be counter-productive to state goals. The Taiwanese government's policy of distancing itself from the PRC is undermined by increasing Taiwanese business ties to China (Roy, 1999).

any one state to garner an effectively large share of power in the system. Superpower competition overwhelmed and suppressed competition by lesser states during the Cold War. Smaller countries fell into one or the other superpower spheres of influence and control. Their efficacy and potential threat were evaluated in relation to how they added or subtracted to the US or Soviet power. The end of the Cold War increased the number of competitors, threats, and the complexity of national security for all states. In the post-Cold War world, states must contest with a larger number of self-serving competitors for power and security. Because power and security are relative commodities, the margins for success against a greater number of competitors are less tolerant than before. States that have unified policies, long-term goals, and can focus their sources of national power toward achieving those goals will succeed over states that lack control over their national security doctrines and have incomplete sources of national power.

Comprehensive Security is increasingly a disreputable and ineffective policy for Japan (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 and Lim, 1998). International conditions have changed since 1991 that prevent Japan from translating its economic power via US military strength, into complete national power to the extent that it did during the Cold War. *Kinken gaiko* damages Japan's international standing by rendering it an unreliable ally and partner. It is increasingly failing to produce concrete results reliably in the post-Cold War world as events in India, Pakistan and Africa have shown. Its assumptions about the primacy of money have been castigated as an acceptable norm for international relations. It has demonstrated that its core methods, the giving and taking of money, are less of a concern to other nations than military security. (Lim, 1998) Finally, it is increasingly

undermined by forces outside the control of the government making it an unreliable doctrine. Japan appears to be increasingly compelled to seek a balance in its elements of national power by increasing its capabilities for armed force, the element most atrophied in its national security doctrine.

C. DOMESTIC ECONOMICS

Domestic economic factors will likely contribute to a growth of Japanese military capabilities in that country's pursuit of national security. The financial crisis in Japan, coupled with US pressure for financial reform, could significantly lessen Japanese government and corporate collusion thereby diminishing the government's ability to impact economic security. Concurrently, severe demographic shifts threaten to push Japanese corporate and industrial assets overseas in search of economically viable means for vital export production. As the second largest democracy, Japan's interests are worldwide. Japan's economic evolution may cause its global interests to become even greater with a corresponding increase in its responsibilities to provide security for growing number of assets and citizens overseas.

1. Crony Capitalism and Technoeconomic Security

Corporations in Japan enjoy close economic and political collaboration with the government. This collaboration, or "crony capitalism," is the primary way that the Japanese government attempts to influence economics and thereby influence national security. Under this system, corporate viability is not solely subject to the controls that

profitability establishes. The state maintains an unprecedented level of input into the country's economic base. (Kober, 1995) Government-business collusion, a remnant of the Meiji era, has superceded stockholder input to and regulation of Japanese business. Shareholder leverage is almost non-existent. Unlike American corporations, which generate 80 percent of their capital from shareholder investments and 20 percent from banks, Japanese businesses generate only about 20 percent of their capital from shareholders. About 80 percent of their capital comes from government guaranteed bank loans. (MOF, 1999) The government also grants businesses "discretionary funds" from ready cash reserves provided by Japan's high domestic savings rate and other sources under the government's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP).⁷ (MOF, 1999) By guaranteeing capital, the Japanese government removes incentives for its corporations to structure themselves for efficiency and profitability. In the United States, if a company is unprofitable due to inefficiency, stockholders will desert it leaving the company without its primary source of capital.

Japan's emphasis on "technoeconomic" security and life-time employment means that each of its corporations is a vital contributor to the country's national security. Technology, on which Japan relies to make up for its lack of other resources, is a strategic asset. (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998 :171, 195) The Japanese equate the loss of a corporation to the loss of national security and stability. In Japan's under-developed social security system, employment is a source of domestic and political

⁷ Known as the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), this fund is generated from postal savings (45%), pension funds (25%), postal life insurance (16%), government bonds and loans (7%), investment dividends (2%), and miscellaneous (5%). The 1998 FILP fund was \$496.2 billion. (MOF, 1999)

stability. Money is, therefore, guaranteed by the government to prevent bankruptcy and high rates of unemployment. All governments protect their vital industries as the US bailout of the Chrysler Corporation in the 1980s demonstrated. In Japan, individual companies represent a larger fraction of the country's total industry and, therefor, a larger fraction of its state security. (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998)

The Asian economic crisis and pressure for financial reform may diminish the Japanese government's tenuous input to its economic security through crony capitalism. Free-market constraints, which demand profits, could weaken the ties between Japanese businesses and the country's political parties including the leading decision making body in Japan: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Olsen, 1999). The LDP has dominated Japanese government with few interludes since 1955. Conservative in nature, it is a party comprised of factional committees, most of which are financed and influenced by corporate sponsors, notably, Japan's large conglomerates or *keiretsu*. Businesses provide bribes and faction funds in exchange for guaranteed bank loans, insider access to contract bidding, and protectionist trade policies. (Schlesinger, 1997) This system provides the key ties between government and business (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :17). Japan's financial institutions will be forced into more transparent methods of operation where corporate profitability determines viability. Reform could prompt Japanese corporations to seek foreign locations for cheaper production if forced to become more profitable. Japanese labor, equipment, and land are expensive. To stay competitive, Japanese business may have to look outside the country for investment and manufacturing opportunities. This would increase Japan's overseas business presence.

Japanese government recalcitrance in economic restructuring could erode a significant amount of its national surplus. At present, Japan is attempting to maintain its current economic practices with interest free bank loans for insolvent businesses and government subsidies to corporations that defer layoffs. (Los Angeles Times, 1999). Official unemployment is at four percent (MOF, 1999). Real unemployment, which could conceivably materialize when government subsidies end, may be as high as 25 percent (New York Times, 1999). Restructuring seems inevitable. Japan's Ministry of Finance has called for a restructuring of the FILP system to remove it from corporate collusion. (MOF, 1999)

The reduction of government and corporate collaboration could weaken the state's mechanisms that influence domestic economics as a means of national security. Government leaders would then be forced to look to traditional, realist sources for national security. Increased military capabilities will likely be a tempting choice.

2. Japan's Demographic Shift

Japan's demographic shift toward an older population threatens to erode part of the state's prosperity. Japan has the fastest aging population in the world. This "silver society" is a product of the nation's high life expectancy, the longest in the world, coupled with one of the lowest population growth rates.⁸ According to Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), by the year 2002 the country will have a population

⁸ Life expectancy= 80.45 years; Population growth rate= 0.23%; (Birth rate= 1.00%; Death rate= 0.74%; Net migration rate= -0.037%). (CIA World Factbook, 1998).

profile similar to the State of Florida's (Ezrati, 1997). If current trends continue, Japan's work force will peak in 2007 at around 68.6 million out of 129 million citizens and thereafter decrease. By 2010, over 20 percent of the Japanese population will be over 65 years old compared with 8 percent in China, 9 percent in South Korea, and 13 percent in the United States (Thompson, 1999). If predictions are correct, there will be approximately two workers supporting one resource consuming retired person who does not contribute to the nation's GDP. In addition, Japan's limited work force will continue to grow older. The MHW has established the Council on Population Problems in an attempt to remedy this situation. Thus far, it has determined that the reasons for Japan's population decrease are rooted in cultural and economic factors (MHW, 1999). They are unlikely to be solved soon.

This demographic shift threatens to erode much of Japan's economic surplus, decrease standards of living, and reduce the state's available capital. Demographic impacts could lead to heavier burdens on an increasingly older labor pool, a decline in the growth of income, increased taxation for a burgeoning social welfare system, dwindling savings rates, and a declining national surplus which may be steadily eroded to offset Japan's negative economic growth. Workers would then be in greater demand. Though actual wages may rise, people would be forced to work harder while enduring a possible 18 percent decrease in the standard of living. (MHW, 1999 and Ezrati, 1997) These trends could cause a declining work force to cut its savings rate by half of Japan's traditional 12 to 15 percent of income. This would reduce the Japanese government's primary source of FILP funds. A decrease in available capital might impact Japan's

ability to finance its export production which pays for the importation of vital raw materials, energy sources, and food. Unable to do without imports, the country would be forced to continue with them despite a shortage of capital. Japan could conceivably incur a trade deficit, the hallmark of first world industrialized nations. (Ezrati, 1997 :98) Older people are more likely to vote. They will likely do so to ensure that government expenditures cover or increase their social welfare benefits. They will have the numbers to make this happen. (Thompson, 1999)

3. Japan's Overseas Industrial Shift

If the labor pool decreases past a certain point, Japanese businesses may increase their overseas holdings in an effort to retain ownership of the means of production (Ezrati, 1997). Technonationalism and the fear of a "hollowing out" of the Japanese economy will motivate this tendency (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998). This would likely transform Japan from a mercantile to a headquarters economy where corporations operate networks of industrial facilities from nerve centers in Tokyo and Osaka (Hunsberger, 1997 :217). A shortage of labor along with increased labor demand dictates wage increases. Combined with the increased expenditures that economic viability measures could bring, this would induce more Japanese corporations to establish manufacturing facilities in the less developed countries of Asia, Latin America, and potentially Africa where labor and manufacturing costs are cheaper. (Ezrati, 1997 :99)

The shift overseas is well underway. Japanese overseas facility investments in 1996 were \$900 billion, a 50 percent increase in five years. Major cities in Manchuria,

Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Asian nations contain growing numbers of Japanese manufacturing facilities. (Ezrati, 1997) Many overseas factories now forgo transshipment through Japan, exporting their products directly to other countries. The relocation of a portion of Japan's industrial base abroad along with increased import reliance has reduced the country's trade surplus from \$141 billion in 1993 to \$84 billion in 1996. Some economists predict that Japan could have a trade deficit as early as 2002. (Keidanren, 1998 and Ezrati, 1997 :99)

4. Consequences of a World-Wide Presence

An increased overseas Japanese presence and greater dependence on foreign locations for manufacturing could create two factors that would give impetus to Japan developing an increased military capability. First, where Japanese businesses go, so will Japan's citizens. Already found in large numbers throughout Europe, North and South America, they could become even more prodigious in less stable regions which meet Japanese corporate requirements for cheap labor and rising consumerism.⁹

Second, like most industrialized nations, Japan could see its global interests and citizens increase from their present levels. With foreign governmental ties, increased international production assets, and an increase in bilateral dependencies necessary for its economic interests, Japan might have to react to distant dangers that it can now afford to ignore. (Ezrati, 1997 and Defense of Japan, 1998 :66) With world-wide interests and a global presence comes the obligation to evacuate one's nationals from countries which

⁹ As of 1996, 763,977 Japanese reside overseas (Keidanren, 1998).

become unstable due to revolutions, wars, and natural disasters. Japan would likely be compelled to develop more extensive military capabilities to conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). America alone has conducted or deployed for seven NEOs in the last two years.¹⁰ The Japanese people will not likely tolerate seeing their citizens and businessmen trapped and killed in foreign disasters. Japanese national security policy could be forced to react to these events with a more robust, deployable military force. Even though these policies seem to contradict present Japanese instincts, no state, including Japan, can afford to locate its people and production facilities abroad and not develop the capability to at least threaten to project power to protect those citizens and sources of wealth. (Ezrati, 1997 :101)

5. Solutions Within the Current System

No one is predicting the setting of Japan's sun. Japan may continue to pursue its national goal of economic prosperity while easing its way into transition. Japan could reduce, but not eliminate, its economic difficulties by carrying through with its proposed restructuring of the FILP system. This would free several hundred billion dollars for other uses besides corporate support, though the concomitant drop in employment would severely affect Japanese savings rate, which provides 45 percent of FILP money (MOF, 1999). Japan also could reduce its multi-layered, superfluous goods distribution system

¹⁰ Monrovia, Liberia; Central African Republic; Tirana, Albania; Phnom Pen, Cambodia; Kinshasa, Zaire; Freetown, Sierra Leone; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

that supports "Japanese Socialism."¹¹ This system is one way the Japanese create jobs for their large population, passing the increased costs to consumers. This excess "fat" gives the Japanese some elasticity in responding to upcoming labor shortages.

Japan might consider increasing immigrant labor to offset projected shortages and work in sectors increasingly rejected by Japan's workers. This could allow Japanese industry to keep more assets at home and preclude having to protect interests abroad. Japan's younger generation, products of a prosperous society, are becoming averse to the "3Ks" (*Kitanai, Kiken, and Kitsui*) or dirty, dangerous, and demanding jobs (Van Arsdol, 1999). While Japan's population may decrease, that of its Asian neighbors will continue to increase at exponential rates providing a ready pool of labor. As of 1993, there were approximately 400,000 legal and illegal workers in Japan, many employed in the 3K sectors of work. (Van Arsdol, 1999)

Importing labor is unlikely due to the country's ethnocentric outlook and reluctance to assimilate foreigners. Most Asian nations, especially Japan, determine citizenship based on race and ethnicity. This ethnocentrism often manifests itself in xenophobia. Japan, proud of its unique culture, stands out among Asian nations for the intensity of its discrimination. While immigrant labor might not claim to want a permanent home in Japan, the country's past experiences with Vietnamese refugees,

¹¹ "Japanese Socialism" refers to the numerous middlemen that exist between manufacturers and consumers. This system provides jobs in a finite employment market. Each layer adds its few percentage points to the price of goods, creating high prices for buyers. It is also part of the reason, along with Japan's service oriented culture, that seemingly hundreds of sales representatives mob arriving department store guests and roam aimlessly throughout stores seeking the odd buyer needing help. Japanese people may soon learn to operate their own elevators and pump their own gas as employment generating laws are changed. (Seward, 1971)

which were turned away, indicates that it does not want large numbers of foreigners settling in the country. They are a continual source of friction for a country that prides itself on homogeneity.

Japan has no cultural mechanism, such as Islam in Arabic states or Catholicism in France, for assimilating peoples of other races or cultures (Olsen, 1999). Some 800,000 people of Korean descent, including illegal aliens as well as third and fourth generation Japanese citizens, experience discrimination. Elected Japanese officials are unlikely to repeal rigorous Japanese immigration and labor laws (Van Arsdol, 1999).

Japan's economic trends will likely cause a greater reliance on more traditional sources of national power to compensate for its decreasing economic potency in the world system. As states value power relative to others, Japan will be loath to allow its aggregate strength to fall. Japan's leaders will likely search for a stable element to ensure the security of its livelihood. It will increasingly find that military forces ideally fit this requirement.

D. THE QUEST FOR NORMALCY

Japan's desire to be a "normal country" is often cited as a primary reason it seeks a more capable military (Drifte, 1998). Japan's drive for normalcy is motivated by cultural biases and its desire for prominence, influence, and leadership in the international community. It aspires to be a great nation. To do this, the Japanese believe they need a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This will require Japan to develop an expanded military capability that can fully participate in UN military operations.

1. Japanese Views of Normalcy

Waltz's "sameness" effect is not the only factor prompting Japan's evolution toward normalcy (Waltz, 1979 :127). Two cultural reasons underlie Japanese desires to be seen equal to other great powers in the world. First, "normalcy" is commensurate with equality in Japanese thinking. The Japanese have a national propensity for feeling victimized and are sensitive to implications of inequality.¹² This has been exacerbated by Western racism and condescension toward Asians in the past. Since 1868, Japan has geared its national policy toward erasing Western images of agrarian inferiority and pre-modern backwardness. Its measures included adopting institutions and behavior which conformed to Western expectations for "civilized countries" such as democracy and international participation. Japan abandoned solidarity with Asia to pursue Western-style military and economic competition. Its participation alongside Western nations in the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, the only Asian nation to do so, exemplified this. Japan is periodically reminded that the West once viewed it as an inferior nation. American and Australian anti-immigration laws, aimed at Japanese during the 1920s, infuriated and humiliated Japan. Now that it has bested many of its Western progenitors in the late twentieth century, Japan wants no trace of its previous status to remain.

Second, "groupism" lends a cultural bias for Japan to be like other states. In Japan, the ideas and norms of the group hold primacy over those of the individual. People, and by inference countries, are forced to assimilate or face ostracism.

¹² This desire derives from a unique emotional quality called *amae*; a word that has no English equivalent. It is, roughly, the act of seeking emotional succor from others. When this is denied, resentment, frustration, and feelings of loss, all common to victims, are experienced. (Doi, 1981)

“Groupism” is a unique blend of Confucian subservience to family, nation, and harmony; samurai ideals of loyalty and duty to superiors found in *bushido*; Shinto concepts of the national family; and Tokugawa practices of group liability, *go-nin gumi*, used for over two hundred years to maintain order (Ratti and Westbrook, 1973).¹³ Being part of a group structure is a powerful theme. To be excluded from the group is to lack legitimacy. The Japanese have a saying that illustrates the value placed on conformity: “The nail that sticks out, is knocked on the head.” (Morris, 1975) This desire to conform influences Japan’s desire to be a full member of the sanctioned international community.

2. The United Nations as a Means for Normalcy

Japan has linked its legitimacy in the modern world to membership in the UN. When the League of Nations refused to recognize Japan’s attempt to create an enclosed order in 1931, militant elements in the Japanese government forced Japan’s withdrawal from the world system.¹⁴ It did not fare well as a pariah state and wished to wash away that stain by zealously supporting the international community after the Second World War. Japan viewed its 1956 entry into the UN as another chance to prove itself a

¹³ *Go-nin gumi*, or five-person groups, were used during the Tokugawa Shogunate era (1600-1868) to maintain order amongst peasant and merchant classes. If one member of the group got into trouble, all five were punished. This reinforced already existing ideas of group cohesion found in Confucianism and *bushido*. Though China and Korea used this system during various historical periods, it was most influential in Japan.

¹⁴ This was precipitated by the League’s refusal to recognize Japan’s puppet state of *Manchukoku* (*Manchukuo* or Manchuria) as a sovereign nation. Japan thought it could fare better with a closed economic system based on exclusive resource rights in Korea and Manchuria than it could under sanctions from a world which failed to recognize its sphere of influence. United opposition arose when it attempted to expand this sphere into all of Asia, at the expense of colonial and indigenous governments, as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

responsible nation. In their first White Paper, published in 1957, the Japanese government listed “UN centrism” first among its three pillars of foreign policy.¹⁵ Japan has used the UN to promote its “unsophisticated pacifism” (*soboku na heiwa shugi*) and world friendly ethos to make dealing with it more palatable for nations offended by its Second World War conduct. (Drifte, 1998)

Japan had other realist goals in joining the UN: a desire for full independence from occupation; an opportunity to strip the UN Charter of the “enemy clauses;” and an opportunity to break the monopoly of power exercised by the original charter members. Japanese citizens favored entry into the UN. They hoped that this body might one day assume responsibility for Japan’s defense from the unpopular security alliance with the United States. This stipulation was included in the 1951 peace treaty on Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s insistence. (Drifte, 1998) The Japanese government’s ambiguous stance on Charter revision was an effective domestic consensus builder during the chaotic post-war years. Unanimity was easily garnered due to all factions’ desire to remove the “enemy clauses” of the UN Charter (Articles 53, 77, and 107) which permit actions without UN approval against any country that was an enemy of any Charter signatory nation during the Second World War. These gave the Charter members a level of prestige not open to Japan. Along with most Third World countries, Japan favored revising clauses which limited permanent Security Council membership to the three victors of World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, plus

¹⁵ The other two were cooperation with the free democratic world and membership of Asia (Drifte, 1998). All three of these exemplify Japan’s desire for group membership and acceptance, as well as the importance which they place on UN membership.

China and France. Much dissatisfaction still reigns in the General Assembly over this group's monopoly of power in policy decisions. In an attempt to achieve parity with other great powers, Japan first expressed its goal of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 1969. The Japanese still support revising the UN as they did in the 1950s. (Drifte, 1998 :98)

While membership in the UN might bring Japan legitimacy, it does not bring it normalcy. Incompatibility between UN Charter Article 43, which requires member nations to supply armed forces for collective security duties, and Article 9 of Japan's Peace constitution were ignored by both the Diet and the UN upon Japan's entry. Consequently, Japan does not provide combat forces for potentially dangerous or combatant duty with the UN. (Drifte, 1998 :98)

3. Japan's Money Diplomacy and the Loss of Prestige

Japan desires a permanent seat on the Security Council because it views this as the most powerful and prestigious decision-making body in the world. Real power, including the veto, and status comes with being a member of the elite Permanent Five. (Drifte, 1998) So far, Japan's reliance on *kinken gaiko* and its failure to provide military forces to the UN have hampered this goal. Japan believes it deserves a permanent seat because of its large financial contributions. It is the second largest contributor to the UN budget (18 percent, moving to 21 percent in the year 2000) behind the United States. This is well above Germany's 10 percent, the third largest. Many Japanese are dismayed that they do not have a voice in how the UN spends their money. Cries of "no taxation

"without representation" are coming from even the most vocal supporters of membership. (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :19) This argument is an extension of Japan's customary reliance on economic means to secure foreign policy goals. Because Japan avoids military involvement, as well as engagement in controversial issues, *kinken gaiko* has generated criticism that it is attempting to buy its seat on the Security Council rather than contribute with substantive input and policy formulation, evidences of commitment and leadership (Drifte, 1999 :100). In 1994 a senior Japanese diplomat confirmed the country's commitment to *kinken gaiko* when he commented:

The UN question is basically a question of money. We'll be raising our contribution [to the UN] soon from 12.4 percent to 15 percent, and that should give us a right of entry. (FEER in Drifte, 1998 :100)

International disparagement at Japan's failure to aid its ally or the UN with combat forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War proved that it was unable to achieve world-class-standing with its wealth (Lim, 1998). The war demonstrated that great nations banded together to affect world events with force when necessary. The war also reaffirmed Japanese perceptions that the UN was the organization that played a primary role in the world's conflagrations. LDP Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro was not able to override party and public division to pass legislation which would have sent the SDF overseas in harm's way for the first time since 1945. Eventually citing restraint by constitutional pacifism, Japan donated \$13 billion, \$100 per citizen, to the war effort. The world, as well as many Japanese, saw monetary contributions as the coward's way out of global security responsibilities (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993). Japan had staked its

ideology to solid UN support and had failed that organization in one of its most critical challenges of the post-war era. Japan was derided as unreliable by its only formal ally, the United States. The international community confronted Japan with the sentiment that money was no substitute for blood. "In times of military crisis, the banker does not get nearly as much respect as the soldier." (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :viii) As a result of this and other refusals to participate fully in UN combat initiatives, Japan's attempt at gaining a permanent Security Council seat has been damaged. (Drifte, 1999)

Prestige is a recurring theme found in Japanese motivations. Japan desires a permanent seat on the Security Council in pursuit of international prestige, its long-standing national goal. It is in this reason that we find the strongest cultural influences for equality and alignment with all other great powers, even claims that Japan is superior due to its status as the world's second largest economic power. Owada Hisashi, former Vice Minister in MOFA stated his belief that Japan should become more active in peacekeeping:

The choices of Japan for a course ahead are either whether it wants to become a "normal" country like Europe and the US, which includes participation in military activities, or to become a "handicapped country" that contributes in non-military areas three times more than anticipated. (Owada in Drifte, 1993)

To the Japanese, "normal" means "to have the same prestige and sources of national power as Europe and the US." It does not mean "to have the same prestige as China and India," two countries which also have capable militaries and play a role in the

international system but which are seen as inferior by the Japanese. Japan's perceptions have changed little since 1868 when it entered into the world system on Western terms. The use of the word "handicapped" illustrates that many Japanese believe that their country cannot compete equally or gain an equal measure of respect internationally without military power. Knowing that handicapped people in Japan are often ignored and left out of society's mainstream gives further insight into Japanese perceptions of being internationally handicapped.

The Japanese felt further humiliation at their impotence during the 1996 terrorist takeover of its ambassador's residence in Peru (Nakasone, 1998). Japan's inclination for using money to avoid conflict, its reluctance to use force abroad, and its ineptitude at dealing with crisis situations encouraged the Tupac Amaru guerillas to choose Japanese nationals as their victims. Japanese citizens were critical of their government for its inaction and its pleas to Peru for a "non-violent" solution. (Economist, 1997) Without credible, deployable military forces and the political will to employ them, Japan's wealth will continue to be a target for exploitation by those with no inhibitions to the use of force. Japan's policies and doctrine will be a critical vulnerability which motivates the state to pursue more realist military capabilities and doctrine. (Economist, 1997)

Many argue that Japan, as the primary source of regional investment, would be more representative of Asia in the permanent Security Council than China. The PRC has little by which to claim great power status besides possession of nuclear weapons. India, also a nuclear power, will soon surpass it as the most populous Asian nation. The PRC's future stability is in question as it transitions from socialism to capitalism. China's

economy is also rated seven times weaker than Japan's. Finally, on the world's Human Development Index (HDI), China is ranked 111th; Japan is ranked number three.¹⁶ (Hunsberger, 1997) China was included in the permanent Security Council membership at the end of the Second World War as a concession to American demands. The PRC, however, is a UN member in full standing providing numerous military detachments for peacekeeping missions around the world. Japan is not.

Japan desires a political status and role in world affairs that are equal to its economic prestige. The primary obstacle to this and its seat on the permanent Security Council has been the concomitant requirement to make a military contribution beyond Japan's limited peacekeeping and observation roles allowed under its 1991 Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) bill.¹⁷ (Drifte, 1998) Japan's reliability as an ally or political partner is in question. The UN was founded with the intention of eventually maintaining world peace by force of arms; peace *enforcement* rather than peace *keeping*. (Okubo in Hunsberger, 1997) As world acceptance of the UN has grown, it has incrementally shifted its operations toward peace enforcement. Japan staked its international prestige and part of its security on UN membership and participation but failed to anticipate the costs it would incur to maintain this. Japan also must shift its doctrine if it is to stand equal among other states and evolve with the international system it covets.

¹⁶ Economic level based on 1995 GDP per capita purchasing power parity basis: U.S.= \$27,500; Japan= \$21,300; China= \$2,900. United Nation's HDI is a quantification and comparison of a nation's health, education, and economic level. U.S. (#2)= 0.938; Japan (#3)= 0.937; China (#111)= 0.594. (Hunsberger, 1997)

¹⁷ The PKO bill limits participation to 2000 SDF troops at a time. These forces must be under UN control and cannot be committed unless the operations meet a series of stringent guidelines.

Japan has suggested non-combatant roles that it could fulfill in UN operations in exchange for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Its offers have not been adequate to achieve permanent membership. It has proposed supplying all UN operations with Japanese medical teams or other service support units. (Finn in Hunsberger, 1997) This, however, does not provide what the UN needs most: well trained, reliable combat forces. Other, less affluent nations already supply adequate service support forces. This is not a role commensurate with Japan's international standing and little more than it is currently doing. The UN desires a sign that Japan is willing to fulfill its commitments under Article 43. It must be ready to commit blood, not merely treasure, to the full spectrum of increasingly combat-oriented operations before those on the permanent Security Council, who are currently doing so, will allow the reluctant nation into its ranks.

With power, prestige, and position come responsibilities. Japan cannot have international status and its pacifist ideology at the same time. Attempts to buy this prestige and national security have tended to discredit Japan as a reliable and consistent state. Substituting money for military effort and risk have brought resentment to Japan from states with traditional perspectives of national power and prestige. These states will ultimately decide Japan's worthiness to stand as an equal. Japan desires a permanent Security Council seat under the auspices of wanting to aid world peace but is unlikely to gain serious consideration unless it builds the means and will for unrestricted participation.

E. THREATS

Since 1945, the United States has protected Japan's survival and vital national interests. Several factors may shift much of that responsibility back to Japan: the perception of US unreliability, regional threats, an Asian arms race, and potential long-term threats which Japan must prepare for now to be able to deter later. A general indication of a lack of stability in Asia recently backed up by several threatening events will convince Japan that it must take responsibility for its own security.

1. The Diverging Interests of the US and Japan

National security theory divides a state's interests into the categories of survival, vital, major, and peripheral. National survival, the physical existence of a country, remains a state's core interest. Vital interests are those that will entail serious harm to a nation if not defended. A state will use force to defend both of these if other means fail. Major and peripheral interests are those in which a state will exercise a wider variety of lesser means, such as economic or diplomatic, to defend. Neo-realism recognizes that, for states to be able to apply lesser means of coercion in their foreign policies, such as diplomatic pressure, they must have credible forces and effective doctrines for their use. To directly defend their interests, states must possess a credible deterrence to enemy aggression. At a minimum, a state must be able to defend itself reliably against an enemy attack. (Drew and Snow, 1988) One key to determining if Japan will increase its force capabilities and normalize the conceptual use of force in its national security thinking is

to determine what Japan's survival and vital national interests are and what the threats to those interests might be. If Japan perceives a threat to those interests, it will likely respond with appropriate measures to protect them.

Two prominent categories of Japan's vital interests are natural resources and food. These are essential to Japan's economy and livelihood.¹⁸ They require regional stability and the ability of Japan to directly intervene if those are in serious jeopardy. (Funabashi, 1998) Threats to sea lines of communication, access to disputed fishing grounds, and territorial disputes could interfere with an ensured flow of these resources. Fishing rites are a major concern in Asia. Japan is the largest harvester and per capita consumer of fish in the world, the supply of which is rapidly dwindling (Parfit, 1995). Japan competes with Korea, China, and Russia for scarce fishing areas. Fishing, mineral rites, and freedom of passage are tied to possession of and access to small islands throughout Asia's waters. Many, like the Spratly Islands, are submerged most of the year and are claimed by several nations. Currently, Japan has three territorial disputes: the Senkaku islands with China and Taiwan; Takeshima island with North and South Korea; and the Kurile Islands with Russia. All are included in Japan's definition of its national territory and, thus, are vital interests (Japan Encyclopedia, 1993).

Japan is increasingly uncomfortable in relying heavily on America to defend its interests, both survival and vital. In the past, Japan has chosen to construct forces and doctrine to assist America in defending its survival interests leaving defense of its vital

¹⁸ Japan's industry is built on one of the world's poorest resource bases. Japan imports: 80 % of all its energy, 100 % of its petroleum, 100 % bauxite, 100 % iron ore, 100% raw cotton, wool, and rubber. It also imports roughly 50 % of its food and 33 % of its fish. (Keidanren, 1998 and Japan Encyclopedia, 1993)

interests solely to the United States. In the post-Cold War world, this relationship is changing due to perceptions of American efficacy. First, Japan often expresses doubts about the United States' commitment to maintaining its current levels of commitment in Asia despite repeated American assurances to the contrary. (Thompson, 1999) The disappearance of a threat to America's survival interests (e.g., the Soviet Union) coupled with American troop reductions in the region, causes many Asian states to question US long-term commitment. (Kihl, 1994) A 1997 Japanese poll indicated that only 49 percent of Japanese citizens believe that the United States would assist Japan if it were attacked (Neilan, 1997).

Second, past US performance leaves a trace of doubt about America's ability to fight effectively in the close-terrain, manpower, and casualty-intensive environment of archipelago and mainland Asia. America's warfighting record in Asia since the Second World War is one loss and one draw. Technology, upon which many claim America is too heavily dependant, has twice succumbed to less sophisticated, but more tenacious and casualty intensive, methods of attritional combat still touted by many Asian states including the PRC (Kuiguan in Pillsbury, 1998). The recent conflict in Kosovo may only reinforce the impression that America is over-dependent on technology and reluctant to engage decisively in ground combat.

Third, Japanese and American security interests have slightly diverged. Interests that the United States only considers as major, Japan considers to be vital. The United States is reluctant to interfere in regional, bilateral differences that do not affect the stability of the entire region. Clearly, America is ready to go to war over Taiwan. It is

doubtful, however, that America would sacrifice lives for the Kuriles, Takeshima, or the Senkaku Islands. An indicator of this is that US and Japanese intelligence interests have become increasingly non-congruent. As a result, Japan's DIH has sought bilateral relationships with a broader group of partners (Jane's Defense, 1997). Japan also plans to launch its own reconnaissance satellites to reduce its dependency on America's intelligence sources and prioritization which it sees as unreliable and not geared to Japan's needs (Sakoda, 1999).

Fourth, even with an extensive American arsenal present in and around Japan, the Japanese fear that the United States might not be able to respond to a threat in time to prevent it (Chai, 1997). Wargames testing the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) cooperation against and US responsiveness to DPRK naval incursions into Japanese waters have concluded that US forces would be mired in administrative obstructions while the situation culminated (Economist, 1999).

Last, the physical threats to Japan are increasing, threats that the US-Japan alliance is not designed to defeat. The US-Japan alliance is a *strategic* alliance designed to defend Japan's survival interests.¹⁹ The smaller scale, but important, *tactical* threats to Japan are growing. On 18 December 1998, the South Korean Navy destroyed a North Korean submarine only 30 miles from Japanese waters (Economist, 1999). Similarly, on 23 March 1999, for the first time since the Second World War, Japan dispatched several JMSDF warships and patrol aircraft to chase two suspected North Korean ships in

¹⁹ A survival interest is one that exists when the physical existence of a state is at risk (Nuechterlein, 1985).

international waters near Japan. Invoking its right to "self-defense," the Japanese ships fired warning shots in a failed attempt to stop the suspected North Korean vessels which escaped unscathed (New York Times, 24 March 1999).

This latest incident also demonstrated the shortcomings of Japan's pacifist national security policies. The JMSDF was not able to stop the hostile craft because the SDF is prohibited by law from actually firing at suspected threats and from boarding or inspecting such threats in international waters (Jordan, 1999). The Japanese are worried that their security policies might not allow adequate defense in the future. "Japan's security preparations are not enough," said Yamasaki Taku, head of the LDP panel which debated the recently-passed defense bills allowing greater Japanese cooperation with the US. (Aoki, 1999) Military security is growing as a Japanese concern.

The following sections detail Chinese, Korean, and Russian threats to Japan's interest.

2. The China Threat

China represents a long-term threat to Japan. The PRC gives Japan a sufficient alibi for developing greater military capabilities. First, China's nuclear forces are increasing in quality and quantity. Second, China has the ability to sow disruption in the Asia-Pacific region. Last, China's *potential* military and economic power is the greatest in the region.

The area in which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) excels is nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Japan's involvement in regional security could bring it into conflict

with this nuclear power. With the surreptitious acquisition of America's most advanced warhead designs, China possesses a modern nuclear arsenal capable of dominating Japan. The latest stolen American technology should allow China to produce long-ranged, multiple-warhead missiles, making TMD systems less effective. (New York Times, 1999) Solid propellants also will make them more responsive, not a desirable quality in an unstable country. Anywhere from 150 to 200 M-class missiles are deployed against Taiwan heightening tensions in the region. Japan has relatively close ties with Taiwan and would likely be involved in a conflict as a United States ally if China attempted to take the island nation by force. (MSNBC, 1999)

China's likely role in Asia within the next 15 years is that of regional counter-balancer to American power (Ross, 1997). China claims that it is contained by Japan's involvement in regional security coupled with America's presence. China's nuclear power status, along with its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, gives it leverage in international and regional diplomacy. It will likely attempt to use this power to oppose regional initiatives by Japan and the United States. China will probably strengthen its growing ties to Russia and the Middle East, forming a counter to the US-Japan alliance which it distrusts. The Chinese see the Japanese-American alliance as a shield for future Japanese military growth, an attempt to contain them, and a license to counter a PRC invasion of Taiwan. (Ross, 1997)

China increasingly believes that regional alliances are aimed at limiting its power in Asia. It is responding by increasing its military strength. Japan's attempt to foster a web of bilateral agreements with the ROK, Russia, the United States, and possibly

Taiwan has drawn accusations of Japanese imperialism from China. (Stratfor GIU, 1998)

Japan is searching for military security against a Chinese threat. It believes that whatever measures it takes, either to increase security or maintain the status quo, China will continue to build its military machine, especially its missile and naval forces (Trilateral Naval Cooperation, 1997).²⁰

In addition to Japan's concerns about the PRC as a strong, growing neighbor, China is arguably prone to instability given its type of government and its tumultuous history. (Thompson, 1999) The PRC could undergo a political and civil upheaval as its authoritarian government tries to make capitalism and socialism work simultaneously. Social unrest is at an all-time high in the country and is increasing due to economic transformation and unpopular government policies. Rising nationalism might spark disturbances over Taiwan, the Senkakus (Diaoyu islands), and the disputed Spratlys, where China could exert control over the sea lanes to the Malacca and Lombok Straits.²¹ (Shambaugh, 1997) A disturbance in any one of the aforementioned areas could likely involve Japanese military forces.

It is China's potential that most worries Japan. Its fast growing economy and technology base threaten to field a more technically advanced and capable military in the

²⁰ China has purchased about a billion dollars of Russian weapons per year since 1994, most of them aircraft or ships. They are currently purchasing Sovremenny class destroyers designed to defeat Aegis class ships on which Japan has based its modern fleet. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has deferred plans for an aircraft carrier until after the year 2000. (Thompson, 1999) Japan's TMD system is likely to be deployed aboard an Aegis class ship.

²¹ China's claims to the Senkaku, or Diaoyu islands, dates from the 16th century. As far back as 1830, Japanese maps acknowledged ownership by China giving Japan little credibility for its 1884 claim. (Kristof, 1998)

near future. China has funneled significant military advances from American universities, private industry, and government resources (Webb, 1999). Its economy could be the largest in Asia by 2015. It is suspected of building a blue water navy, more capable nuclear weapons, and a military machine that will return it to its “rightful” place at the center of Asia. Many of its recently acquired US military secrets could be incorporated into the PLA within 15 years (Timperlake and Triplett, 1998). Japan is likely to continue increasing its military capabilities as a response to China’s growth.

3. The Korean Threat

Korea represents three security concerns for Japan: an absence of security cooperation with South Korea; the possibility of a unified Korea hostile to Japan; and a direct North Korean threat to Japan’s physical security.

While South Korea is not a threat to Japan, the lack of effective security cooperation between the two states is a problem. Japan has numerous reasons for desiring security cooperation with the ROK: international good will, containment of DPRK forces, ensuring a friendly unified Korea in the future, and *de facto* involvement in ROK security through the US-Japan security agreement. There are four reasons, however, to explain why Japan-ROK security cooperation has not been more robust. First, no formal agreements can be signed because Japanese constitutional interpretation proscribes collective security agreements. Second, Japan fears that China will interpret closer cooperation as an attempt to contain the PRC.

The third reason is potentially the most problematic. Koreans have deep-seated enmity over Japan's colonial rule. This stands in the way of cooperation. In a 1995 survey of Korean attitudes, an amazing 69 percent responded that they "hated" Japan while only 6 percent said that they "liked" Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 1995). Japan's emphasis on North Korean as threat has only exacerbated South Korean fears that Japan will interfere in their sovereignty. Accordingly, the ROK is demonstrating pan-Korean sentiments. The Director General of the JDA, Nukaga Fukushiro, stated that Japan might consider preemptive air strikes against North Korean missiles "...rather than just sitting and waiting for death." (Stratfor, 29 Nov 98) South Korea opposes any Japanese military actions on Korean soil but has offered no solutions to placate Japan's fears. Japanese reactions, exacerbated by South Korea's inability to mollify their concerns, could further South Korea's mistrust of Japan and push Japan to seek an independent military solution if it feels its highest national interests are in jeopardy.

Enmity between Japan and Korea over their past colonial relationship still generates mistrust. This mistrust is likely to push both nations to militarily hedge its bets against the other. Most Koreans are still vitriolic over past Japanese aggression, especially in the North where hatred of Japan is official policy. The two nations continue to negotiate sensitive issues such as Takeshima/Tok-to Island and comfort women.²² Neither Korea accepts increased Japanese military strength even under the imperatives of the US-Japan Security agreement. The ROK has engaged in a defense policy entitled

²² "Comfort women" is a euphemistic term applied to Korean women who served as prostitutes in the Imperial Japanese military during the Second World War. Most did so against their will.

“360 degree security” which is aimed at containing Japanese military power (Olsen, 1999) Its military acquisitions are in line with those needed to prosecute a war on Japan rather than the DPRK. In 1996, the ROK Navy deployed three destroyers in response to Japan’s claim over Takeshima Island (Glain, 1997). Ties between South Korea and Japan are slowly increasing as a result of Japan giving yet another apology for its misdeeds to Korea, written down this time in a joint agreement signed on 8 October 1998. Unfortunately, mutual trust is not likely to grow as fast as mistrust between the two countries. Japan and the South Korea will probably continue to cooperate under the auspices of the trilateral relationship with the US while each unilaterally builds its forces for security.

The fourth factor inhibiting close cooperation between Japan and South Korea is their geostrategic rivalry (Menon, 1997). Japan and South Korea are arguably the two most dynamic states of North East Asia. Their geographic proximity and similar economies create friction between the two countries. The SDF believes Korea to be a potential threat to Japanese security, the traditional “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.” (Olsen, 1999) In a dynamic not dissimilar from sibling rivalry, both seek the primary attentions of the United States as a geostrategic partner (Olsen, 1999). In addition, Japan fears the potency of a unified Korean nation. North Korea’s collapse would create a populous country (approximately 68 million,) with a large armed forces, very near Japan. (Menon, 1997)

Japan also fears that if Korea unifies it will drift into its traditional Chinese orbit (Trilateral Naval Cooperation, 1997). Walt, in his balance of threat theory, states that the

closer a nation is to a traditional threat, the more likely it is to bandwagon (Walt, 1987). Historically, the rise of Korea has paralleled the rise of China (Kim in Kihl, 1994 :23). The ROK refutes this possibility. President Kim Dae-Jung has even expressed his desire for American troops to remain on Korean soil after unification. These political sentiments could easily change in the wave of Korean nationalism likely to accompany unification (Olsen, 1999).

The DPRK stands as a clear and present danger to Japan's national security. North Korea has abducted Japanese citizens from its territory (Jordan, 1999). It also frequently lands clandestine forces in Japan. The Japanese regularly monitor North Korean messages to these agents. (New York Times, 1999) North Korea also has threatened to use WMD against Japan. In a 6 April 1994 interview, the DPRK Ambassador to India and a former vice foreign minister told South Korea's Yonhap News Agency that "...our nuclear arms, if developed, would be primarily designed to contain Japan." (Reuters in Park, 1998 :112) North Korea's August 1998 missile launch served to convert North Korean hyperbole into a credible threat. Japan has used this act to build domestic support for and rebuff international criticism of acquiring TMD. However, no missile defense system can protect all 363,000 square kilometers of Japan from ballistic missiles fired from sites as close as North Korea (Cloughley, 1996 :71). To be effective, Japan would have to develop a pre-emptive strike capability with aircraft or cruise missiles; a solution hindered by its constitution.

4. The Russian Threat

Russia, like China, remains a long-term military threat to Japan and an immediate threat to the stability of Asia. While its military readiness is currently at low ebb, Russia intends to continue its position as a major world and regional influence as its intervention in Kosovo demonstrates. Russians believe they must counter the growing hegemony of "the West" led by the United States and Japan in Asia. (Stratfor GIU, 1999) Russia plans to continue development of more powerful intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles represented by its latest TOPOL-M design (ROK MND, 1998). It has already expressed its displeasure for planned Japanese military capability expansion under the US-Japan security agreement. Russia's position as a Pacific power has always been in question. Its current insecurities, caused by regional political turmoil and economic problems, may cause Russians to reassert themselves forcefully in world events.

5. Asia's Arms Race

Russia also threatens stability by exacerbating Asia's arms race. Moscow is a primary supplier of advanced military weaponry to the region. This flow of weapons, Chinese irredentism, and the perception of receding American power in the region have caused a rise in Asian military spending, armed forces capabilities, and domestic arms manufacturing capabilities. (Johnson, 1997) Based on calculations by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, military spending in East Asia has risen from an average of \$126 billion per year in the 1984-1988 time frame to \$142 billion annually from 1992-1994. In 1996, Asians accounted for 48 percent of the world's purchases of

large conventional weapons such as aircraft, tanks, and submarines though spending is currently down due to Asian financial difficulties (SIPRI in Glain, 1997) China's military spending has increased 12 percent from 1997 to 1998. Sample increases during the 1984-1994 time frame include: Japan, 41 percent; South Korea, 65 percent; Taiwan, 58 percent; Thailand, 65 percent; and Malaysia, 62 percent. (Klare, 1997)

There are trends in Asia's arms procurement. Generally, military growth in Asia has been concentrated in its maritime forces (Bracken, 1998). This poses the greatest threat to maritime Japan. Many Asian countries are converting their coastal navies into power projection, ocean going forces (Klare, 1997). New capabilities are being added. Pakistan and India have both become nuclear powers. The Royal Thai Navy has acquired a Spanish aircraft carrier with Harrier aircraft. Thailand has increasing close ties to China. It has traditionally survived by bandwagoning with the dominant regional power (Olsen, 1999). It could conceivably add this capability to China's navy in the future.

The end of the Cold War decreased stability in Asia on levels affecting Japan's vital and survival interests. The Japanese will likely meet these with increases in their military capabilities and alterations in their use of force. A greater willingness to use force may cause a tacit acknowledgement in Japan that military action has a rightful place the country's national security policies.

F. THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

The US-Japan security alliance will be a primary factor in shaping Japan's emerging military capabilities. It is fitting to apply Lord Palmerston's observation on

Britain's foreign policy to Japan: "[Japan] has no eternal friends, no eternal enemies, only eternal interests." Critics disparage the US-Japan alliance as obsolete with the disappearance of the Soviet threat (Hosokawa, 1998). One of the primary purposes of the alliance, however, is the maintenance of stability in Asia. The end of the Cold War removed many superpower restraints on East Asia making it one of the least stable regions in the world (Saito, 1998). The alliance is as relevant as ever. Japan and the United States will continue to favor the US-Japan alliance because of their common interest in regional stability, common threat perceptions, and because the partnership has been validated as a stabilizing factor in Asia since 1945 (Saito, 1998). The alliance also conforms to the modern trends of Japanese alliances. Japan will continue to support it because the alliance allows Japan to normalize its mechanisms of national power at its own rate, chiefly by increasing its military capabilities (New York Times, 1999). Alliance tensions, manifested as Japanese insecurity and nationalism, will shape the character of the partnership and impact Japan's military growth. The United States is often forced to both goad Japan into adhering to the alliance and retard Japanese over-exuberance (Economist, 1999 and Japanese Naval Attaché, 1999). By properly understanding the nuances of the US-Japan alliance, America can influence its development, functioning, and the evolution of Japan's military.

1. The Continued Existence of the Alliance

Though there are many issues where Japanese and American security concerns in Asia diverge, there are still enough common strategic interests in the region that will solidify their relationship (Saito, 1998). As the world's two most technologically advanced and wealthiest democracies, both states desire physical and economic security which are best maintained by stability in Asia and a continued majority share of the region's net power. Though the nature and intensity of threat is asymmetrical and of varying modes and degrees for Japan and the United States, the existence of the threat is real (Walt, 1987 :44). Both states see China, the Koreas, and Russia as common threats to their aspirations. (Kawano, 1998 :11) The competition for a controlling share of power in Asia will only intensify and bring the two nations closer. World polarization between China and Russia, which fear containment, and "the West," led by the United States, will continually reinforce Japan's historic affiliation with the West and traditional animosity with China and Russia (Stratfor GIU, 1999 and Walt, 1987 :33 and 153).

The magnitude, proximity, and historical enmity of the regional threat will cause Japan to balance against it in alliance with the United States as it has in the past (Walt, 1987 :153). Unlike China and Russia, Japan has nothing to fear from the United States' benign brand of maritime power (Wirtz, 1998). It has endured the worst possible consequences of an adversarial relationship with the US, conquest and occupation, and found them to have been fairly inoffensive and beneficial (Olsen, 1999).

Japan also will retain its alliance with the US because it has proven a favorable security strategy since 1945 and because there is no plausible alternative at present

(Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :46). Japan's alliance with America has been the most successful in its history. It has allowed Japan to achieve nearly all of its national goals and to conduct both its internal and external affairs with little risk to its national security as no other arrangement has in the past (Defense of Japan, 1997). No other country is financially or militarily powerful enough or has the political desire to replace the United States in this relationship. Japan will follow *evolutionary* change in its security system rather than *revolutionary* change that would risk disrupting this safety net.

The US-Japan alliance conforms to trends in Japan's modern alliances. To alter this arrangement would be a radical shift in Japanese policy for which there is no catalyst or precedent. Japan has a modern history of alignment with the world's hegemonic powers in pursuit of its goals. For most of the period beginning in 1868, Japan has almost continually allied itself with one or more major powers: first with France then Germany; then Britain in 1904, and later with all the Triple Entente allies until the 1920s; with the Axis powers until 1945; and with the US during the Cold War (Green, 1998 :22). Each peacetime change of alliance partners was precipitated by radical shifts in world and regional events causing Japan to seek greater security. First, Germany supplanted France as the primary military power in Europe and thus a more successful model for the infant Meiji State. Alliance with Britain offered a maritime, hegemonic partnership and a check to French aid for Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. During the First World War, Japan joined the Allies which allowed it to exploit a power vacuum in Asia during the First World War. During the 1930s, Japan joined the Axis because of its own economic collapse and abandonment by the United States during the 1930s. With

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is still the world hegemon and the best guarantor of security. In the current US-Japan alliance, both parties seek to increase the quality of an association that needs adjusting to post-Cold War imperatives. No new international paradigms exist that would terminate Japan and America's relationship. A radical shift in alliances, for no apparent reason, would cause alarm among Japan's neighbors (Defense of Japan, 1997 :106). Only America's loss of power could precipitate such a drastic change in Japanese thinking.

Thus, questions over the long-term continuance of the US-Japan alliance have been in error. Problems between the two states have been seen as diminishing the prospects for alliance survival. They should be seen, however, as growing pains within a successful union. The following sections explore how obligations under the 1996 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines might cause Japan to increase its military capabilities. They also depict that, rather than working to eliminate the alliance, stresses between Japan and America could likely shape the extent and character of Japan's military force construction.

2. The Alliance as a Source of Military Growth

The predominant dynamic between the US and Japan is Japanese insecurity. Alliance insecurities will motivate Japan's creation of a power projection military force. Japan suffers from an entrapment-versus-abandonment dilemma in its relationship with the United States (Green, 1998 :22). In its efforts to maintain a claim to national sovereignty and balance its international relations, Japan fears being drawn into

detrimental political situations because of its obligations to the United States. At the same time, Japan fears being either ignored or neglected by the US in diplomatic and security issues. Much of its rearmament decisions may be seen as a reaction to this predicament. Japanese defense policies swing from recalcitrance over fears of entrapment to near militant fervor in an effort to draw attention to its vulnerable political position in Asia and proximity to regional threats. (Green, 1998 :13) Japan may feel compelled to gain greater military capabilities by its reactions to insecurities within the alliance. As international condemnation of Japan eases and threats grow, Japan may opt to gain more unilateral security by incrementally increasing its military power.

3. Japanese Insecurity and Nationalism

Two factors will impact Japan's alliance insecurities, and ultimately urge it toward building a more capable military: the asymmetrical nature of the US-Japan relationship, and Japanese nationalism. (Green, 1998 :13) These two factors also will give Japan the leverage to rearm according to its own terms.

The asymmetrical relationship between the United States and Japan will give Japan the leverage to pace the magnitude and type of military force to its self-interested agenda. Japan is clearly the junior partner in the alliance and closest to the primary threats to that alliance. America, with relative protection from overseas affairs provided by distance, can make demands or place restraints on Japan that the latter may find more expensive to follow rather than to violate. Japan's reluctance to meet US expectations within the alliance is well known. This position has given Japan leverage in the alliance

out of proportion to its apparent physical power within the relationship. This leverage has been enhanced because Japan is able to manipulate politically the level of assistance supplied to it by the United States through public opinion and recalcitrance.²³ America is continually placed in the position of "begging" Japan to cooperate in regional and domestic defense. (Walt, 1987 :44)

Japan may be able to dictate the *pace* of increasing its capabilities but it will ultimately be forced to do so. Japan will face the task of fulfilling provisions of the alliance and deflecting criticism for this. The alliance will provide an excuse to overcome this opposition. Japan is gradually moving into compliance with the provisions of the US-Japan defense cooperation guidelines which it signed under US pressure and over Chinese and Russian protests. This obligation has enabled Japan to comply progressively with the guidelines thereby staving off American impatience, domestic opposition, and international criticism. Japan is able to use the alliance as a plausible cover to increase its military capabilities as it has already done with the acquisition of AWACS, air-to-air refueling capabilities, and major combatant ships. (New York Times, 1999)

Nationalism will continue to evolve into more than a basis for mercantile realism within Japan's comprehensive security doctrine (Green, 1998 :13). If properly manipulated by America, it could motivate Japan to create a more potent and capable

²³ The United States has been on the diplomatic defensive in Asia as it has fought to defend its position as a unipolar hegemon. Except for Guam, the US is entirely dependent on host nation compliance for regional support. In the wake of America's loss of economic hegemony in Asia, and diplomatic failures such as the Philippine base closures and Japanese public unrest over a large military presence, the US has appeared increasingly impotent (Yahuda, 1996). Many Asian states also question America's resolve to continue its role in the region (Yahuda, 1996).

military force without creating negative side effects. Nationalism is a product of Japan's insecurities. It is partially caused by Japan's entrapment and abandonment dilemma. Professor Tadokoro Masayuki of the Japan Defense Academy, claims that Japan's nationalism is suppressed. Its lack of military capabilities and its pacifist policies have created a "legitimacy deficit." He believes it is dangerous, therefore, to keep the Japanese mentally introspective. (Tadokoro in Drifte, 1998). The United States, by allowing and even coaxing Japan into developing a "normal" state can do much to subvert the potentially dangerous consequences of uncontrolled nationalism. But America must be careful of pushing too hard. US pressure for Japan to assume a greater share of defense burdens, recent criticism over Japan's financial performance, and protectionist rhetoric from Congress and the US Trade Representative Office has served to exacerbate Japan's feelings of abandonment. This pressure, criticism, and protectionism inflame Japanese nationalist and anti-American sentiments (Funabashi, 1998). On 16 March 1999, outgoing Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Saito Kunihiko, warned that a high level of criticism could re-ignite Japanese nationalist and militarist sentiments. While this outcome is unlikely, it is significant that a Japanese official used the term "militarism," the existence of which the government has denied, as a veiled threat against America. (Stratfor GIU, 1999) Tokyo's recent election of an ultra-nationalist mayor, Ishihara Shintaro, author of *The Japan That Can Say No* and legislation to rid Tokyo of Yokota air base, is further proof that nationalism is on the rise. Ignoring Japan in favor of China, a critical blunder of the Clinton administration, also exacerbates Japanese insecurities (Funabashi, 1998). Ignoring Japan, legalistic

approaches to the alliance relationship, and undue pressure will only result in negative Japanese reactions. US foreign relation skills must become more nuanced to handle the complex and delicate relationship with the Japanese.

4. Technonationalism and Nuclear Weapons

Japan's ability to construct nuclear weapons may wed it closer to the United States and promote increased construction of conventional forces. Japan could only defend itself unilaterally if it adopted nuclear weapons. Deployment considerations and political will make this alternative to the US-Japan alliance problematic.

The possibility that Japan might adopt nuclear weapons is an extreme example of technonationalism²⁴ (Green, 1998 :13). Japan maintains the plutonium, the delivery capability, and the knowledge to construct a nuclear weapon within six months (Nakasone, 1999 and Young, 1978).²⁵ This latent capability does not go unnoticed in Asia. The density of Japan's population and industry, 70 percent of which lays between Osaka and Tokyo, coupled with its scarce land area make it impossible for the country to build or deploy a large enough land based nuclear weapon system to threaten an in-kind retaliation vis-à-vis the PRC or Russia. (Nakasone, 1999 and Young, 1978) The only

²⁴ "Technonationalism" is a component of Japanese nationalism. This pride in Japan's technical abilities, which also stems from feelings of insecurity, motivates the state to indiginize certain sectors of weapons and industrial production in an effort to preserve its sovereignty and prevent entrapment that might occur by relying on US weapon sources.

²⁵ Japan's H-II rocket can deliver a two metric ton payload into space (Japan Encyclopedia, 1993). Japan's commercial light-water reactors produce plutonium with 60 percent Pu-239. This material, with processing, could be rendered into weapons grade plutonium. (Imai, 1998)

countries Japan could credibly threaten with a land-based nuclear force are North and South Korea. Japan would have to build a sea-based launch capability to attain an in-kind retaliation capability. It does not have the national will, available capital, or the capabilities to do this. The assembly of one nuclear weapon would abrogate Japan's non-proliferation pledges, remove a primary pretext for alliance with the US, and abruptly reverse its longstanding diplomatic position on WMD sending alarms throughout Asia. This would result in sever diplomatic problems. (Nakasone, 1999)

Japan's inability to possess nuclear weapons effectively may increase its insecurities and motivate it to develop more extensive conventional forces and doctrine. India and Pakistan's recent criticism of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty "clique" divided the international community between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." Japan's diplomatic failures with India, Pakistan, and North Korea have classified it to many as an international "have-not." (Funabashi, 1998) Loss of face equates to a loss of prestige for Japan. It may compensate for this inequity with greater military capabilities and normalization of the concept of military force.

The US-Japan security alliance will likely stand as Japan's source of vital national security in a changing and uncertain world. In its ever-continuing search for greater security, however, Japan will likely increase its conventional military capabilities. The US must understand the nuances of the alliance's dynamics if it is to make it compliment America's capabilities and policies. Too often, the US is tempted to view Japan as an "Asian England" with the concomitant geopolitical characteristics implied in that misconception. Unlike the US's European ally, Japan's insecurities must be ameliorated

with skillful American leadership. Insecurity and nationalism are both a stimulus for and a restraint on evolving Japanese military capabilities and concepts of force in their national security policy. Manipulated properly, the United States can influence Japan's national security processes and the quality of the alliance. Heavy-handedness, however, could cause Japan to make decisions outside the bounds of logic and mutual benefit.

III. OBSTACLES TO NORMALIZATION

Japan must decide whether to eliminate Article 9 of its constitution as an obstacle to its national security process or to continue to reinterpret it based on changing requirements. The Article's role as an obstacle to freedom of action will only increase as demographic challenges make Japan's security and economic prosperity more dependent on the credible use of military force.¹ Dispassionate analysis reveals that Japan should alter its constitution to reflect reality. Public opinion will dictate otherwise.

Two issues have reopened the debate on Article 9. The first, previously discussed in Chapter I, is the need for increased military security. The second is that the costs of altering Article 9 have been reduced. In the post-Second-World-War era, Japan adopted an ethos of minimum defense, pacifism, and a reactive foreign policy sensitive to international criticism. This ethos was institutionalized over the course of fifty years through the establishment of formal rules and structures of which Article 9 was the most effective. Periodic Cold-War reformers in Japan discovered that the élite's entrenched interests and the costs of altering institutions established by the system over the years prevented alteration of the constitution. (Chai, 1997 :28) These transaction costs were impediments to change. Destruction of these impediments now permits alteration or elimination of Article 9.

¹ See Chapter II for a discussion of those factors.

A. TRANSACTION COSTS

Transaction costs are the products of vested interests and infrastructures created by these interests. Much of Japan's government has been structured around a bullish Japanese economy and a static security environment. (Chai, 1997 :31) The Persian Gulf War, recession of Japan's economy, the DPRK's Taepodong missile launch, and Japan's recent naval clash with DPRK ships have all contributed to the destruction of the old economic and security paradigms built during the Cold War. With new paradigms come new institutions and actors with new focal points and agendas to react to the new requirements of the altered system. New requirements for security are bringing a concomitant rise in the influence of the JDA and SDF and their minority of advocates.² With this comes a corresponding, relative loss of power by those who are dedicated to the old paradigm. This principle has recently manifested itself in the unanimous support of all major Japanese political factions for the increased use of the SDF abroad as each political faction strives to remain relevant to the issues of the times (Stratfor GIU, 1999). Before the two dramatic events which roused Japan from its Cold War stupor, political focal points centered on making the old comprehensive security and crony capitalist paradigm work in a changing environment. The new political focal points are the increased use of military forces and the reinvigoration of the economy through reform.³

² The trend in the United States has been for the military and the Department of Defense to become increasingly active in both foreign policy and diplomacy. Part of this is domestic: an executive administration narrowly focussed on Europe. Part of this results from greater levels of conflict in the unstable international environment. Military officers are seen as better equipped to handle the conflict associated with diplomacy. To a lesser extent this is beginning to happen with Japan.

³ The increase is incrementally small but, relative to past opinions, large.

B. ELIMINATING ARTICLE 9

There are many reasons why Japan should eliminate Article 9 from its national security policy. On first consideration, the decision would seem to be the logical conclusion of a cost-benefit analysis. Article 9 is a hindrance to Japan's pursuit of its national goals. In the past, Japan has used this constitutional constraint to preserve its focus on economic primacy (ACCJJ, 1998 :14). The efficacy of economic primacy disappeared with the recent economic crisis. Article 9 also is an obstacle to full UN participation, and by inference, to a permanent seat on the Security Council and Japan's preeminence in the international system. In 1993, then Secretary General Boutros Boutrus-Ghali stated:

My hope is that the government of Japan will be able to change the constitution so that it will allow the Japanese forces to participate in operations of peace enforcement.

The underlying reason for Article 9 also has disappeared. In 1946, a peaceful, democratic Japan was merely an international desire without precedent or tradition to insure its supremacy. Article 9 was the guarantor of that democracy. (Drifte, 1999) Today, Japan's establishment of democratic norms has supplanted this legalistic guarantee. Article 9 is obsolete.

C. REINTERPRETATION AND PUBLIC OPINION

If a constitutional conflict arises, Japan probably will choose to reinterpret Article 9 to suit its immediate needs rather than alter its constitution. There is no popular support for changing it. Surveys taken in 1997 of more than 6300 voters by Nikkei Research, Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), and the Yomiuri Shimbun show that only 42 percent supported revising the constitution in any way. Article 9 was simply one issue considered. (Roper Center, 1999) In addition, there is no precedent for a constitutional convention in Japan (Olsen, 1985).

The Japanese are not likely to alter their constitution because altering any part of it would be seen as altering their democracy as a whole. (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993) Japan's democracy is different than the United States'. Because America was founded on democracy, it has known no other system. Americans have a tactile, visceral sense of democracy that few changes in outward conduct or laws could alter. The United States is, therefore, flexible in its attitude toward adapting democracy to the needs of the time. America invented it, or so we think. It is what we decide it is. Japan is static in its understanding of democracy.

The link between the Japanese people's internal sense of constitutionalism and government policy is unique among the world's democracies (Beer in Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993 :103). It is a linkage based on legalism rather than visceral emotion and cultural attachment as in America. The Japanese have only experienced democracy for 50 years. It was superimposed on their society in 1946 rather than developed from the cultural proclivities of the nation. They value it highly as a system that has provided

social and economic benefits over the years but have no deep-seated cultural attachment to it. Japan's national identity is not defined by a history of dedication to democratic abstracts such as *liberty* or *freedom*. No Japanese blood has been shed in defense of their democratic ideals. It is emotionally inexpensive compared with the brand of democracy practiced in the United States. On the contrary, Japan's blood was shed fighting those who espoused it in the Second World War. Democracy, then, is a "black box" represented by the Japanese constitution, the inner workings of which are a mystery. To eliminate a piece of it would be to fundamentally alter the democracy as a whole. (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993)

Article 9 is one part of the "black box" that Japanese people understand and to which they have a close attachment. It is the heart of their democracy. (Hayashi, 1999) They are not likely to do away with it. Japanese brandish its ethos, *pacifism*, in an attempt to distance themselves from national misdeeds during the Second World War.

As author Tetsuya Kataoka notes:

Article IX is to the Japanese constitution what the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is to the American constitution: more than mere written words on a piece of document (*sic*), it has become the very essence of the Japanese regime or polity (In Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993 :103).

Chalmers Johnson comments, "Most Japanese equate Article 9 of the constitution with democracy itself; to alter one is to alter the other." (Johnson, 1997) Past attempts to alter

the constitution have failed as they are likely to fail in the near future. (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993 :103)

IV. MARITIME IMPERATIVES

...This much is certain; that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will. Whereas these, that be strongest by land, are many times nevertheless in great straits.

--Francis Bacon

Chapter II demonstrated that Japan is being compelled to restore balance to its national security policies by normalizing the use military force. The question then arises: *what form will this military force take?* Japan will likely give emphasis to its naval forces. This is not to say that Japan will do away with its land or air forces. On the contrary, these branches would be necessary to support Japanese maritime power.

A. A MARITIME NATION

Japan is a maritime nation with corresponding maritime modalities (Funabashi, 1998). Captain A.T. Mahan, in his book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, lists six characteristics of a sea power.¹ He asserts that the extent to which a nation possesses these will determine its strength as a sea power and maritime nation. Japan possesses all six to a great extent.

¹ These are: 1) Geographical Position- As an archipelago, Japan is directed toward the sea; 2) Physical Conformation-Japan possesses a territorial configuration conducive to the maintenance of sea power; 3) Extent of Territory-Japan is not overextended in its physical possessions; 4) Number of Population-Japan has adequate population centers on its coast and adequate available population and technology to maximize that population in maritime activities; 5) National Character-Japan has great aptitude for commercial pursuits and an export economy; 6) Character of the Government- Japan's government assists trade but derives its impetus and power from its people. (Mahan, 1894 :29-89)

As a maritime nation, Japan has challenges that are best met with maritime solutions. Naval power benefits Japan because:

- a. It is least disruptive to the region.
- b. It is the best means to achieve Japan's national goals.
- c. It is least volatile to domestic political considerations.
- d. It can most effectively defend Japan from its external threats.
- e. It is best suited to the political requirements of Japan's evolving economy.
- f. It is necessary to fulfill the requirements of Japan's alliance with the United States.
- g. It can best maximize Japan's national talents while contributing most to its economy in return.

These are detailed in the following sections.

B. THE UTILITY OF MARITIME FORCES

1. The Least Disruptive

If we accept that internal and external factors will compel Japan to increase its military force projection capabilities, then it would make sense for Japan to do this in a way that minimizes the anxieties of its Asian neighbors who are wary of any Japanese military power. Maritime forces are unobtrusive and the least disruptive to Japan's Asian neighbors. They will draw the least notice from other nations. (Bracken, 1998) International opinion is critical for Japan's global acceptance and its domestic consensus.

Responsibly maintaining naval forces is a way for Japan to demonstrate its trustworthiness to the world and repair the regional distrust formed during the Second World War. Unlike continental forces sent abroad, a navy comes with its own readily perceivable means of withdrawal (Wirtz, 1999). Ships can be pulled out to sea where they are out of sight but still available to support developing contingencies. (Bracken, 1998) Aircraft must either depart areas of operations after delivering their troops, making hasty extraction impossible, or sit vulnerably in airports where they are visible reminders of a nation's presence.

2. An Aid to National Goals

Maritime forces are the best means to achieve Japan's national goals. By contributing naval forces to UN operations, Japan could aid its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. One of the primary obstacles to obtaining this seat has been Japan's reluctance to make a military contribution to UN operations beyond its limited peacekeeping and observation roles (Drifte, 1998 :94). Maritime contributions would enable Japan to contribute to UN operations and fulfill its goal of having a "normal nation" while maintaining a significantly reduced regional and world footprint. With a dominant Maritime Self-Defense Force, and a correspondingly limited Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF,) Japan could only be expected to provide contributions commensurate with its capabilities and strengths. Instead of limited half-measures, such as global medical teams that gain little international credibility, Japan could provide sea-

based logistic support, naval security, and anti-air defense for multi-lateral operations. This would permit Japan to contribute combat forces with honor and minimum presence.

3. Domestic Politics: Japan's Critical Vulnerability

Maritime forces are the least disruptive to domestic politics. Japan's aversion to casualties will cause it to seek technological solutions in the use of military force. Commitment of maritime forces, rather than air units or ground troops, reduces the possibility of casualties, and the resultant negative popular resistance to overseas military engagements. The Japanese government and the SDF will continue to be vulnerable to public opinion in any future military operation. (Bracken, 1998) It would pay political dividends for Japan to reduce its ground footprint to the absolute minimum possible. Air facilities are often the focus of violence in troubled states. Static ground forces are extremely vulnerable to terrorist actions or even conventional targeting as America has discovered in the Middle East.² Casualties are Japan's greatest vulnerability, more so than other countries given its pacifist political climate. The death of two Japanese servicemen in the 1993 Cambodia peacekeeping operation caused intense public outcry and pressure to terminate such operations. Almost half of all Japanese polled after the event called for the force's withdrawal until one of the serviceman's fathers pleaded for national support. (FEER, 1993) The small, volatile factions likely to be encountered in an OOTW environment seek disproportionate political gains through violent ground actions against first world critical vulnerabilities such as an intolerance for casualties.

Japan's political vulnerability could make it a liability in any multi-national operation. It would likely be targeted by terrorists or insurgents among any coalition forces to exploit this vulnerability (Olsen, 1999). Antagonists in OOTW scenarios will not likely present a sophisticated naval or air threat to coalition maritime forces. The use of maritime forces lessens the chance that Japanese combatants would come into direct contact with belligerents and messy ground actions.

4. Threat Response

Japan's military security threats are maritime in nature. It is no surprise that Japan's three largest military confrontations since the Second World War have involved naval forces.³ Clearly, defense against North Korean infiltrators, Russian military resurgence, and Chinese hegemony, along with its ability to act in any of its island disputes, is largely a function of Japanese naval power.

Japan can best defend against its survival level threats with sea power. At present, these are North Korea's ballistic missile program and the Chinese and Russian nuclear missile arsenals. While Japan's ultimate defense is the US nuclear umbrella, it seeks a means to defeat these threats unilaterally, with a minimum of force, rather than solely relying on in-kind retaliation. Nations will strive to achieve security, one way or another. Ultimately, the Japanese will do this either through JDA Director General

² Terrorist attacks on the Marine barracks at Beirut Airport (1983) and the Air Force's Khobar Towers (1996), along with the Iraqi SCUD missile attack on the US Army barracks in Bahrain (1991), are reminders of the dangers of static land presence and the benefits of sea based power.

³ 1957—Interception of and firing on a Soviet ship; 1996—Dispatch of Maritime Safety Agency ship over Taiwanese student occupation of an island of the Senkakus; 1996—Interception of and firing on North Korean ships violating Japanese waters.

Nukaga Fukushiro's "first strike" option (possible, but remote) or through a missile defense system (Stratfor, 29 Nov 98).

Current TMD aspirations reside in the development of a Navy Area and Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense system in conjunction with the United States. As a strategic asset, a sea-based TMD system will likely stimulate a greater Japanese focus on sea power and production of additional assets to protect this valuable system. Japan plans to augment its interim, ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability Three (PAC 3) with the Navy system deployed on its fleet of Aegis destroyers. This sea-based system is preferred over land-based systems due to a warship's strategic and tactical mobility (Truver, 1998 :39). Japan's advanced Aegis fleet air defense system, with minor improvements, already contains the launchers, sensors, and command-and-control mechanisms needed for an effective TMD system (Gaffney, 1998 :73).

Russia and China have denounced Japan's adoption of a sea-based TMD system. China fears containment and transfer of the system to Taiwan in the event the PRC decides to reunite the country by force. Opinion sensitive Japan has not hesitated on this issue, however. This issue serves to illustrate that Japan can be decisive in its pursuit of national security when it believes its survival interests are threatened.

C. FORCE SHAPING FACTORS

Japan's economic system, its developmental trends, and the country's increased level of cooperation with US forces will give impetus to further development of its maritime capabilities. These factors have not only reinforced the importance of sea-lane

control, but have created a requirement for Japan to conduct amphibious operations to support NEOs and effect logistic support to American forces. Japan's current capabilities are insufficient to fulfill these tasks. The US-Japan security agreement also provides parameters that will assist Japan in defining the size and capability limits of its maritime forces. They have confirmed Japan's status as a *guerre de course* naval power.

1. Amphibious Requirements of a Maritime Economy

Maritime forces are best suited to fulfill the political requirements of Japan's evolving economy. Over-committed US forces in Asia coupled with post-Cold War instability and change of perceived threat has prompted Japan to reshape Maritime Self-Defense Force for control of sea lines of communication and OOTW. The reshaping effort has required a greater emphasis on naval presence, amphibious capability, and open ocean patrolling rather than the JMSDF's traditional emphasis on anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare in close proximity of the Japanese archipelago. (JDA, 1998) This is reflected by Japan's desire to build Aegis class ships and updated amphibious vessels (Naval Attaché, 1999) This change in emphasis is not surprising given that Japan's economy is wholly dependant on maritime trade and supply.

Japan's economic trends also are giving impetus for a limited forced-entry, amphibious capability. Japan's evolution toward a headquarters economy coupled with its desire to retain the means of overseas production has created an increased Japanese presence overseas. This presence is compelling Japan to create the capability to conduct NEOs. (Ezrati, 1997) American experience has demonstrated that only amphibious

forces possessing platforms with multiple, forced entry capabilities are sufficient to execute these operations.

Japan will not always be able to ensure the safety of its citizens by ordering them home on chartered planes as they do now. Many nationals living overseas feel compelled to stay in collapsing countries to protect their interest, often until it is too late. Intelligence sometimes fails to predict catastrophic, political upheavals far enough in advance to allow orderly evacuations. Commercial airports are usually the first facilities seized or destroyed in political upheavals. Japan has been reluctant to focus on NEOs in the past. Recently passed legislation permitting NEOs gives emphasis to this requirement, however. Japan's procurement of the controversial *Osumi* class amphibious ship is also tacit acknowledgement of the need for a greater amphibious capability.⁴

Mere possession of amphibious ships does not enable Japan to conduct NEOs. Japan will have to modernize its doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting amphibious operations, the most difficult of all military maneuvers. Currently, the Japanese are loath to even use the word "amphibious" believing this connotes aggressive intentions (Japanese Naval Attaché, 1999). Japan must set its political sensitivities aside and confront the fact that any naval operation involving a demonstration, raid, assault, or withdrawal to or from land is an amphibious operation. Japan, likewise, cannot avoid proper planning and procuring equipment for these operations. Amphibious operations require adequate ground forces, weapons systems, and transportation assets for security and for operations at sea and ashore. They also

require greater cooperation between ground and naval forces as the United States Marine Corps (USMC) can attest. One of the Japanese military's greatest weaknesses is the lack of recent experience on which to base its training and doctrine (Alexander, 1993). Japan's military could gain valuable insights for amphibious operations from a closer working relationship with the USMC and Navy.

2. Maritime Alliance

A maritime force is necessary to fulfill the requirements of Japan's alliance with the United States. The US-Japan security alliance is an alliance of two maritime nations that requires maritime forces to fulfill its provisions. This alliance will increase Japan's maritime focus. It will help determine the capabilities that Japan will create by specifying a division of labor between the US and Japan for maritime operations.

Since 1997, the US has been pressuring Japan to do more both militarily and economically, for stability in Asia (Economist, 1999). In the recent guidelines for US-Japan defense cooperation, Japan responded to this pressure by agreeing to cooperate with US forces in situations surrounding Japan (JDA Guidelines, 1999). Although Japan insists that its assistance will be determined by situation rather than by geography, Japan will probably concentrate on its 1000 mile zone of operations agreed to in earlier discussions (Economist, 1999 :24). A look at a map will confirm that operations in this area will be predominantly maritime. Japan's commitment to assisting the US sounds ambiguous. The Japanese, however, have little real choice. Failure to support a US

⁴ The JDA has stated that the JDS *Osumi* could play a part in international disaster relief operations

engagement in Asia, in the wake of Japan's performance in the 1991 Gulf War, could be diplomatically disastrous, and jeopardize the alliance. (Kawano, 1998).

The new guidelines could require Japan to increase its amphibious and sea-borne logistic capabilities. Japan may find it necessary to increase its amphibious cargo and underway replenishment vessels to fulfill roles expected by the United States. Although much of the support Japan would give to the US would be to forces stationed in Japan proper, an extended conflict, say in Taiwan or Korea, would likely involve Japanese maritime resupply. Currently, Japan has only two, at-sea refueling ships which are inadequate for extended operations (Sakoda, 1999).

Japan's naval power is relegated to a *guerre de course* role. It is capable of handling limited military actions and support rather than large engagements spanning the spectrum of naval operations. Large engagements are the realm of a *fleet navy*. Japan maintained a sophisticated fleet navy until 1945. It found, however, that it could not sustain it due to Japan's limited resources. Japan has conveniently left the construction of such an expensive and politically volatile naval force to the US. (JDA Guidelines, 1999) Roles are also allocated to each country based on its capabilities. It has, so far, been content to achieve the protection benefits from America's fleet Navy by way of alliance.

The nature of the US-Japan alliance will help define the limits of Japanese naval power. Japan, left alone to define the size and capabilities of its naval forces, would exceed that with which the United States, and the world, is comfortable. The US acts as

(Bristow, 1998)

the “cap in the bottle,” preventing extensive Japanese naval growth by reducing the need for fleet naval forces.⁵ Without the restraint of the alliance, Japan would construct larger naval assets such as aircraft carriers or amphibious assault ships. Even with the benefits of alliance, the US has had to use its dominant position to dissuade Japan from building aircraft-carrying ships. Recently, Japan sought both greater naval aviation capabilities and larger fleet-type ships. The US rejected both as too volatile for regional stability. (Japanese Naval Attaché, 1999) Rising nationalism and North Korean military adventurism may make restraining Japan a more difficult task in the future.

D. THE RETURN OF A JAPANESE FLEET FORCE?

Japan’s introduction of the *Osumi* class of ships could be the beginning of fleet-type assets for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The configuration of the JDS *Osumi*, which Japan claims is an LST, is closer to that of the *Wasp* class, Landing Helo Dock (LHD) than a traditional LST. It could have a larger operating and design potential than what the JDA indicates. The front of the *Osumi*’s flight deck is truncated, with the bow jutting out another 157.5 feet (Janes, 1999). The *Osumi* and her sister ships could be transformed into amphibious assault ships with a fixed wing capability. (Bristow, 1998) A 200 foot long, bow ramp could easily be added to the ship increasing its flight-deck length to over 600 feet, sufficient to launch and recover Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft such as the Harrier (Bristow, 1998 :80). At the very least, the *Osumi* will allow the JMSDF to hone its skills in flight deck operations and perfect

⁵ This phrase is attributed to General Stackpole, USMC.

carrier and amphibious ship component designs in preparation for more capable ships in the future.

Due to the growth of other Asian navies, the United States will find it difficult to mollify Japan's naval aspirations. Thailand has set a precedent which might allow, or compel, Japan to acquire more capable naval assets. The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has acquired the Spanish-built aircraft carrier, the RTN *Chakrinareubet*, giving it East Asia's only sea-based air power.⁶ At 11,500 tons, it outclasses the *Osumi*. (Cole, 1997) Thailand's increasing ties to China could cause alarm (Olsen, 1999 and Cole, 1997). China has been seeking an aircraft carrier for its fleet but is thought to lack the necessary engineering skills to completely design one from the keel up (Cole, 1997).⁷ Thailand could conceivably give China access to one for reverse engineering. These threats would justify Japan's pursuance of greater capabilities to retain its leading position in Asia's naval race (Klare, 1997).

E. NATIONAL EFFICIENCY

1. Matching National Capabilities to Force Construction

Emphasizing the primacy of its maritime forces will permit Japan to maximize its national resources in pursuit of a credible and effective military. The law of comparative advantage dictates that a country must maximize its resources or suffer disadvantages in

⁶ India, a South Asian state, also possesses an aircraft carrier.

⁷ Thailand has purchased significant quantities of Chinese weapons including warships and anti-ship missiles. Frigates imported from China were so poorly constructed that they required significant amounts of extra work before they could be declared operationally fit. (Cole, 1997)

military effectiveness and economic efficiency. States must construct military forces that can best be formed and sustained by their national modality. The shape a country's military takes must be suited to its production base, economy, talents, and national character. The form must be compatible with the means.

The need for compatibility dictates that a continental power cannot become an effective maritime power and a maritime power cannot become an effective continental power. The consequences of trying to do so are usually economic degradation and defeat. Two examples of this are Imperial Germany's failed bid for naval supremacy as a continental power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and maritime Japan's inability to subdue China from 1931 to 1945. States which correctly match the form of their military power to their national modality have much greater opportunities for effectiveness.

A shift to a predominantly maritime oriented military is the most efficient use of Japan's national resources while contributing most to its economy in return. As the cost of labor is rising due to Japan's evolving economy and shifting demographics, the country is seeking to construct a technological solution to its need for armed forces (JDA, 1999). Japan will likely see the *ship* as the technology best suited to carry out its military needs. Overall, naval forces are the most efficient use of Japan's industrial capabilities, engineering talents, and contribute the most in return through benefits to the national economy.

2. Personnel Costs

The cost and availability of personnel in Japan could play a role in the country's shift to a more technologically dependent, maritime oriented military. Naval forces are usually the least manpower intensive. People generally cost more than machines. The JDA's highest expenditures are for personnel. Japan's 1997 defense budget was \$41.2 billion of which 43 percent were personnel costs (Defense of Japan, 1998). Compare this to the United States which spends only about 28 percent annually on manpower (Department of Defense, 1999). Currently, the JMSDF maintains the most powerful Asian naval force with only 15.5 percent of all personnel in Japan's armed forces, including reserves, while the Ground Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) have 68.5 and 16.0 percent respectively (JDA, 1998). It takes fewer people, and is therefore cheaper, to man a warship than a regiment or an air group.

A shortage of personnel, for social, economic, and demographic reasons, is already affecting the Self-Defense Forces. They will have an even more difficult time attracting qualified recruits in the future without significantly increasing costly benefits. The JGSDF has only been able to fill 80 percent of its manpower structure for several years (Japanese Naval Attaché, 1999). By 2010, male military manpower availability could drop by as much as 30 percent if current trends continue (Ezrati, 1997; CIA, 1998; and Defense of Japan, 1998). In contention with cultural norms, the SDF has recruited more women into its ranks raising the total to about 4.2 percent of all personnel.

3. Japan's Engineering Talents and Deficiencies

Japan is able to produce the weapons of the JMSDF better than it can complex weapons systems in either the JASDF or JGSDF. For all of Japan's technical skills, its military weapons designers and engineers lack the ability to integrate sub-systems into complex weapons. Japanese excellence in component subsystem design, however, makes warship production a much more attainable goal (Alexander, 1993 :51). The conceptual development of military weapons systems requires a combination of technical acumen and experienced military judgement (Alexander, 1993 :31). Japan suffers from a lack of modern combat experience from which to develop weapon design parameters. A country needs its own operational parameters if its engineers are to ingrain an effective design process into their own military industrial thinking. Having relied on American designed weapons for decades, Japan lacks this cognition as well as previous design experience with which to improve its current procedures. This flaw is partially the result of Japan's modern design traditions. Instead of seeking to produce militarily effective weapon systems, their primary goal has been to acquire foreign technologies for transfer to Japan's civilian industries. Japan has produced many effective weapons. Effectiveness, however, was a byproduct of their design process rather than its primary goal.

(Alexander, 1993)

Failure to indiginize a design process has prevented Japanese industry from conducting effective systems engineering. Attempts at designing weapons systems have resulted in a host of technologies "cobbled" together, building-block style, rather than a symbiotic combination of sub-systems which smoothly function together. (Alexander,

1993 :31) The results of these deficiencies are similar to those produced from Soviet-style reverse engineering. Producers know the *how* but do not know the *why* that enables them to create and innovate.

The most recent example of this is the creation of Japan's F-2 fighter. Originally, the Japanese planned to indigenously develop and produce the aircraft. Japan's inability to integrate sub-systems resulted in a heavy reliance on the United States for design. About 40 percent of the fighter is US built (Klare, 1997). Ships, in contrast to aircraft, have less tightly integrated subsystems and are therefore more conducive to building-block design and construction.

Japan can also produce ships cheaper than other weapon systems of comparable military efficacy. As a maritime nation, Japan's design talents and national industry excel in ship design and construction. The Japanese build almost half of the world's gross tonnage in a given year (Keidanren, 1998).⁸ Japan can produce ship hulls cheaper than the US or Britain due to an economy of scale and the more developed production techniques of a well established civilian industry, something that does not exist for other Japanese weapon systems (Drifte, 1986 and Alexander, 1997).

Japan's laws prohibiting weapon exports make it impossible to create an economy of scale for most of its weapon systems.⁹ Ships, however, have more dual use components than other types of weapon systems. For example, Japan's newest tank, the

⁸ In 1998, Japan completed 10,049 thousand tons. World production was 24,187 thousand tons. (Keidanren, 1998)

⁹ Japan expressed interest in producing small aircraft for the Asian market in 1996. An international market for their aircraft might enable the Japanese to create an economy of scale for indigenous fighter production similar to its ship industry. The failure of its YS-11 aircraft in the 1960s, the dominance of Boeing and

Type 90, cost almost three times that of America's more advanced M-1 Abrams (Alexander, 1997).¹⁰ Japan is also in the habit of licensing many of its ship subsystems from foreign manufacturers, a practice that saves the country up to three times the cost of indigenous production (Drifte, 1986).

Airbus (60 and 40 percent of the total market respectively,) and Japan's economic downturn are all discouraging factors.

¹⁰ Type 90= About \$5.5 million; M-1= About \$2.2 million.

V. CONCLUSION

Many factors are forcing Japan toward a change in its military capabilities and its conception of the use of military force in its national security doctrine. These forces, which emanate from economics, military threats, and national insecurities, are fostered by changes in the international system brought about by the end of the Cold War. Japan's reaction to those changes will decide the role of military forces in its national policies.

The Japanese desire to remain constant in a changing world. They would like to maintain their pacifist ethos, current national security mechanisms, and the primacy of economics in their Comprehensive Security doctrine. Japan has a political hierarchy of needs that may ultimately dictate its policies and actions.¹ Japanese attachment to their national goals established in 1868, particularly their desire for international prestige, makes it impossible for its citizens and politicians to remain rigid in an ever changing international security environment.

A. AN INEVITABLE MARITIME POWER

Japan will likely evolve toward great power status. To attain this status and their other national goals, the Japanese will probably have to adopt a complete range of sources for their national power, including military force. The Japanese must ensure their protection from current and potential enemies, such as North Korea and China. They must ensure their economic livelihood, made complicated by Japan's lack of resources

and an evolving economy. Stability in Asia is crucial to these objectives. The Japanese have defined their national goals, and the means to achieve them, within the norms of the international system. They must garner a share of power from this system by operating according to that system's rules. That system dictates that military power is important. Japan can "borrow" some of this power from the United States via the alliance. It must contribute increasing quantities of its own power to that alliance as the partnership evolves. It is wedded to the US-Japan security agreement and the United Nations. Both commitments require a measure of might.

If Japan refuses to acknowledge the evolving norms of this system, as North Korea has, it may be punished by that system. Signs that Japan's pacifist methodologies based on the primacy of economics are invalid in the post-Cold War world have already materialized. Japan has been punished by financial crisis, increasing direct threats from North Korea, and its inability to prevent nuclear proliferation in Asia through financial aid. Japan's diplomacy is limited by its lack of a range of national power sources, including military force, in its policies. (Funabashi, 1998) In 1998, former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro observed:

The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan seemed to leave the Japanese feeling powerless. Even our political leaders lacked a clear foundation or position on which to base their response on behalf of nonnuclear Japan (Nakasone, 1998).

¹ Abraham Maslow argued that every person has a hierarchy of needs that must be satisfied. These ranged

An increased dedication to the US-Japan security agreement is an acknowledgement of the validity of force in national security policy. We might even view official adoption of the *Hinomaru*, the Japanese flag, and Ministry of Education requirements that all Japanese students pay deference to it as a signal of a realist awakening in Japan. In the past, the Japanese government refused to give official recognition to the de facto national emblem on the grounds that it was a symbol of pre-Second World War militarism, indoctrination, and emperor worship (USA Today, 1999). Acceptance of the flag is not a return to militarism. It is a sign that Japanese are increasingly viewing themselves and their country as a sovereign state governed by the norms that apply to all other states.

Japan's need for greater military capabilities is manifesting itself in increased maritime forces. Its restructuring efforts and weapon procurements have begun a building process that will result in a technologically advanced, maritime force. For the foreseeable future, it will be a complement to the US fleet. Coupled with its increased satellite and aerial refueling capabilities, Japan will possess a greater power projection force in the future. To focus on any other type of force would be to ignore Japan's technical capabilities and national resources as a maritime state.

B. INTELLIGENT HANDLING OF THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

Japan will follow international norms on the restraint of military forces as well as for the growth of its military capabilities (Carpenter, 1995). By all expectations, it will

from basic psychological requirements to food, shelter, and medicine (Maslow, 1999). I argue that states

act as a cautious realist rather than as a rampaging militarist or feint-hearted pacifist (Funabashi, 1998). Japanese development of military capabilities and incorporation of force into their policy doctrine will be a slow and incremental process typical of a democracy. Japan's national ethos, constitution, unique history, and international opinion will slow its development and give it a surreptitious character, often mistaken as connivance by Westerners. This dynamic may change as Japanese citizens with direct war experiences recede from positions of influence.

Japan's rate of military growth, size, and capabilities will depend on how the United States manages the alliance relationship. America must understand Japan's unique position in history and the Asian region. The US is dealing with Japan from a position of political, economic, and psychological superiority. America's influence with Japan is tied to its ability to address Japanese insecurities to their satisfaction.

have a hierarchy of political needs that must conform to the construct of their national ethos and modality.

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